Abstract
New symmetric coalition conflict equilibria are proposed. Together with already known equilibria, they allow one to find the strongest equilibrium in the majority of static and dynamic conflict problems.
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References
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The study is carried out according to the OITVS RAN program, Project No. 1.3.
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Translated from Kibernetika i Sistemnyi Analiz, No. 2, pp. 80–89, March–April 2007.
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Smol’yakov, E.R. Extending the theory of conflict equilibria. Cybern Syst Anal 43, 225–232 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-007-0041-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-007-0041-y