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Can We Trust the Trust Words in 10-Ks?

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Abstract

We examine the relation between earnings information content and the use of trust words, such as “character,” “ethics,” and “honest,” in the MD&A section of 10-K. We find that earnings announcements of firms using trust words have lower information content than earnings announcements of firms that do not use trust words. We also find that the value relevance of earnings is lower for firms using trust words than those not using trust words. Further, firms using trust words are more likely to receive a comment letter from the SEC, pay higher audit fees, and have lower corporate social responsibility scores. Overall, our results suggest that firms that use trust words in the 10-K are associated with negative outcomes, and trust words are an inverse measure of trust.

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Notes

  1. Larcker & Zakolyukina (2012) and Hope & Wang (2018) apply linguistic analysis to assess the likelihood of management deception. A textual analysis could be useful in identifying misleading corporate disclosures that can result in wealth transfers to managers from investors (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). Deloitte Consulting’s textual analysis tool, Bullfighter, found that when Enron's performance began to sink, its communications became increasingly laden with ambiguous words and sentences (Finextra, 2003). Similarly, Craig et al. (2013) find that Ramalinga Raju, former Chairman of Satyam Computers, changed his word choices noticeably in the five annual reports prior to the collapse of Satyam.

  2. The complete list of trust words used in the study appears in Section “Measure of trust”.

  3. Audi et al. (2016) report that firms use an average of 0.6315 words of the 21 trust words and the 90th percentile is 2. We find an average of 0.94 words and the 90th percentile of 2 in our pooled sample (untabulated).

  4. See Merkl-Davies & Brennan (2007) for earlier studies on impression management.

  5. Guiso et al. (2015) do not find evidence of the relation between advertised values and Tobin’s q.

  6. Haggard et al. (2008) report that firms with higher disclosure quality tend to have lower price comovement and lower price crash risk.

  7. These findings are consistent with Yuthas et al. (2002) that managers engage in ethical communication to establish legitimacy with stakeholders.

  8. Corporate narratives are not audited or regulated.

  9. Prior research views value relevance as a measure of decision usefulness (see Joos & Lang, 1994; Collins et al., 1997; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Lev & Zarowin, 1999).

  10. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged with the number of first occurrences of the 21 trust words (TRUSTF) in 10-Ks.

  11. Untabulated results show that 27.72 percent of firms using trust words use them once, and 14.46 percent of the firms use trust words for 2 years in a row. 57.82 percent of the firms use trust words for 3 years or longer in a row.

  12. Untabulated results show that the mean (median) value of the number of first use of trust words (TRUSTF) in the pooled sample is 0.940 (0.0), comparable to the mean (median) of 0.632 (0.0) in Audi et al. (2016) based on data from 1997 to 2012. The mean length of 10-Ks is 55,236, compared to the mean of 42,275 words in Audi et al. (2016), suggesting an increase in the number of words in 10-Ks in recent years.

  13. We interpret our results as evidence of the association between lower earnings information content and the use of trust words, not as trust words causing lower earnings information content.

  14. Our results in Tables 3 and 4 remain qualitatively unchanged with TRUSTF.

  15. Functional form misspecification may arise if the dependent and independent variables are misspecified (Shipman et al., 2017).

  16. The sample was matched with replacement. The mean (median) propensity score of firms using trust words is 0.4768 (0.4819) while the mean (median) score of firms without trust words is 0.4768 (0.4816). The mean (median) firm size (SIZE) of firms using trust words is 5.5877 (5.5786) while the mean (median) value of firms without trust words is 5.5984 (5.5894). The mean (median) ROA of firms using trust words is − 0.1426 (0.0156) while the mean (median) value of firms without trust words is − 0.1522 (00177). The SIZE and ROA differences are statistically insignificant. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with the likelihood of using trust words, consistent with the view that managers may use discretion in the writing to manage impression (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2017). The likelihood of using trust words is positively associated with size, loss, and complexity.

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Acknowledgements

We thank Sheila Killian (editor), two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at Bentley University, Kingston University, University of Texas at San Antonio, and the 2022 American Accounting Association Annual Meetings for helpful comments and suggestions on our paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Accounting Department, Lubin School of Business, Pace University, 1 Pace Plaza, New York, NY, 10038, USA

    Myojung Cho

  2. Department of Accountancy, Bentley University, 175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA, 02452, USA

    Gopal V. Krishnan

  3. Accounting Department, SKK Business School, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2 Sungkyunkwan-Ro, Jongno-Gu, Seoul, 03063, Korea

    Hyunkwon Cho

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Examples of Firms Using Trust Words in the MD&A Section of 10-K

Hillenbrand Industries, INC (2007) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 2; and TRUSTTL = 3)

An increasing emphasis is being placed within U.S. hospitals to assure quality of care through increased accountability and public disclosure. Quality indicators surrounding patient safety and clinical outcome measurements are increasingly being publicized, and improvement of institutional performance is a matter of focus by many hospital executives and their boards. The “pay for performance” initiative by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) aims to better align reimbursement with improved patient outcomes and the reduction of adverse events. Transparency through public reporting of quality data continues to accelerate, as well as the focus to increase accountability through penalties or rewards resulting from whether quality measures are reported.

Bank of America Corporation (2009) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 1; and TRUSTTL = 1)

The Corporation’s risk management infrastructure is evolving to meet the challenges posed by the increased complexity of the financial services industry and markets, by our increased size and global footprint, and by the rapid and significant financial crisis of the past two years. We have redefined our risk framework, articulated a risk appetite approved by the Board of Directors (the Board), and begun the roll out and implementation of our risk plan. While many of these processes, and roles and responsibilities continue to evolve and mature, we will ensure that we continue to enhance our risk management process with a focus on clarity of roles and accountabilities, escalation of issues, aggregation of risk and data across the enterprise, and effective governance characterized by clarity and transparency.

Coca Cola (2010) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 1; and TRUSTTL = 1)

Our vision for sustainable growth includes the following:

Planet: Being a responsible global citizen that makes a difference.

Willbros Group (2010) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 2; and TRUSTTL = 2)

Adherence to our values of safety, honesty and integrity, our people, our customers, superior financial performance, vision and innovation and effective communication will guide us in the execution of our strategy.

KeyCorp (2013) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 2; and TRUSTTL = 3)

MRM is an independent risk management function that partners with the lines of business to identify, measure, and monitor market risks throughout our company. MRM is responsible for ensuring transparency of significant market risks, monitoring compliance with established limits, and escalating limit exceptions to appropriate senior management. The various business units and trading desks are responsible for ensuring that market risk exposures are well-managed and prudent

PDC Energy, INC. (2014) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 1; and TRUSTTL = 2)

We define adjusted cash flows from operations as the cash flows earned or incurred from operating activities, without regard to changes in operating assets and liabilities. We believe it is important to consider adjusted cash flows from operations, as well as cash flows from operations, as we believe it often provides more transparency into what drives the changes in our operating trends, such as production, prices, operating costs and related operational factors, without regard to whether the related asset or liability was received or paid during the same period

(…)

We define adjusted net income (loss) as net income (loss), plus loss on commodity derivatives, less gain on commodity derivatives and net settlements on commodity derivatives, each adjusted for tax effect. We believe it is important to consider adjusted net income (loss), as well as net income (loss). We believe this measure often provides more transparency into our operating trends, such as production, prices, operating costs, net settlements from derivatives and related factors, without regard to changes in our net income (loss) from our mark-to-market adjustments resulting from net changes in the fair value of unsettled derivatives

(Ellipsis Added)

HSBC Finance Corp (2016) (TRUSTDM = 1; TRUSTF = 2; and TRUSTTL = 3)

Our credit and portfolio management procedures focus on ethical and effective collection and customer account management efforts for each receivable

(…)

We are committed to delivering the highest quality financial products and services to our customers. Critical to our relationship with our customers is their trust in us, as fiduciary, advisor and service provider. That trust is earned not only through superior service, but also through the maintenance of the highest standards of integrity and conduct. We must, at all times, comply with high ethical standards, treat customers fairly, and comply with both the letter and spirit of all applicable laws, codes, rules, regulations and standards of good market practice, and HSBC policies and standards.

(Ellipsis Added)

  1. Trust words are italicized

Appendix 2

See Table 8

Table 8 Variable definitions
Full size table

.

Appendix 3

See Table 9.

Table 9 Propensity of using trust words in 10-Ks
Full size table

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Cho, M., Krishnan, G.V. & Cho, H. Can We Trust the Trust Words in 10-Ks?. J Bus Ethics 190, 975–992 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05350-y

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