Abstract
The readability of 10-K reports, in terms of linguistic complexity, determines the usefulness of information disclosure for stakeholders, particularly individual investors. Since investors largely depend on the financial communication in 10-K reports, firms have an ethical and legal responsibility to present disclosures in a language investors can understand. However, motivated by self-interest, managers obfuscate such disclosures to mask their own actions and hide unfavourable information. Building on the managerial obfuscation hypothesis grounded in stakeholder-agency and ethical-sensitivity theories, I hypothesize and empirically test the relationship between board gender diversity (BGD) and the readability of narrative disclosure in 10-K reports. Based on a relatively large sample of Russell 3000 firms for the years 2002–2018 (6,268 observations), I find a significant positive impact of BGD on 10-K reports’ readability, which in turn improves firm performance. Channel analysis reveals that the findings are driven by (a) female independent directors, and (b) their representation on audit and compensation committees; however, board activity (board meetings and directors’ attendance) does not appear to drive this relationship. Finally, I find that although gender discrimination in the appointment of directors spurs complex readability, the BGD-readability relationship is consistent in gender-biased and non-discriminant firms. I also check the robustness of our main empirical results in several ways. My study has important regulatory and managerial implications in that corporate governance is an important determinant of the readability of disclosure documents.
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Data Availability
The data sets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from public sources identified in the manuscript.
Notes
Loughran and McDonald (2016) provide an excellent survey of the contemporary literature on the method and uses of textual analysis.
The Fog index has received criticism due to the fact that it treats all words as complex which use three or more syllables. However, there are a number of words (such as ‘liability’) that use three or more syllables but are still understandable to the least-sophisticated investors (Loughran & McDonald, 2014).
See Bonsall IV et al. (2017) for more details on the construction of the Bog index.
We adopt the managerial ability measure proposed by Demerjian et al. (2012), and the data are available from http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html.
Bonsall and Miller (2017) suggest the following interpretation of the Bog index: “0–20 = Excellent; 21–40 = Good; 41–70 = Average; 71–100 = Poor; 101–130 = Bad; 131–1000 = Dreadful; 1000+ = Gobbledygook”.
We also check the validity of our instrument by employing Hansen’s J test, and untabulated results show that the instrument was valid.
We check the validity of instruments in system GMM through AR(1), AR(2), Hansen test of over-identification and difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity. The results show that only AR(1)’s null hypothesis can be rejected – this is what is required in system GMM (Wintoki et al., 2012).
As with the case in Lara et al. (2017) that within non-discriminating firms, there will be firms that have a female director in some years and in some years they have not. Thus, we also apply this strategy at the firm-year level, where we identify as non-discriminating all firm-years with at least one female director, and our untabulated results were qualitatively indifferent.
We follow Lara et al. (2017) and set a cut-off of low probability as ≤ 10%. In our untabulated analysis, we also consider firm-years in the lowest quartile as having low probability and our results were largely unchanged.
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Acknowledgements
I am thankful to Brian P. Miller for making Bog index data available online. I am also thankful to Bill McDonald for providing the file size and number of 10-K words data, and Peter Demerjian for making managerial ability data publicly available. I thank the associate editor, two anonymous reviewers, and Dr. Rashid Zaman for their useful comments on the earlier version of this paper. Finally, I thank the Department of Accountancy and Finance (University of Otago) for financial support and Khurshid Ali for helping with data collection. Any errors are my own.
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Appendix: Variables definition
Appendix: Variables definition
Variable | Definition |
---|---|
Dependent variables | |
BOG_INDEX | The ‘Bog index’ reported by Editor Software’s Stylewriter 4 provides a comprehensive measure of a document’s plain English problems, including passive voice, redundant verbs, use of jargon, and sentence complexity, among others (Bonsall & Miller, 2017). A higher level of the Bog index reflects worse document readability. We use the Bog index data of Bonsall et al. (2017) |
FILE_SIZE | Net file size (in megabytes) of the 10-K document (Loughran & McDonald, 2014). In regression analysis, we use the natural logarithm of the FILE_SIZE |
LOG_WORDS | Natural logarithm of total number of words in 10-K report |
Independent variables | |
GENDER | Board gender diversity measured as percentage of female directors on board |
GENDERt-1 | Board gender diversity measured as percentage of female directors on board in year t-1 |
GENDERt-2 | Board gender diversity measured as percentage of female directors on board in year t-2 |
WDUMMY | A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one female director on board, 0 otherwise |
BLAU | Blau index of heterogeneity |
Control variables | |
BOARD_SIZE | Number of directors on board |
BOARD_INDEP | Percentage of independent directors |
DUALITY | A binary variable equal to 1 if a CEO is also the chair, 0 otherwise |
CEO_TEN | Number of years the CEO has been in the position |
CEO_AGE | CEO age |
CEO_ABILITY | CEO managerial ability from Demerjian et al. (2012) |
LN_CEO_SALARY | Natural logarithm of CEO total compensation |
LN_OPTIONS | Natural logarithm of options awarded to a CEO |
INTERNAL_CONTR | A dummy variable equal to 1 if a client received a NO for effective internal control, 0 otherwise |
AUDITOR_IND_SPC | 1 if a firm is audited by an audit firm that has a fee market share of at least 30 percent in the industry |
Big4 | A dummy variable equal to 1 if a client is audited by a Big 4 firm, 0 otherwise |
SEGMENTS | Number of business segments |
COMPLEXITY | The sum of receivables and inventory divided by total assets |
M&A | An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm was involved in merger and acquisition, 0 otherwise |
ABACC | Absolute discretionary accruals based on modified Jones model |
ROE | Net income before extraordinary items over total equity |
FIRM_SIZE | Natural logarithm of the total assets of a firm |
SALES_GROWTH | The ratio of change in sales to prior-year sales |
LEVERAGE | Leverage measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets |
CAPITAL_INT | Capital intensity measured as the net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets |
R&D_INT | R&D intensity measured as total R&D scaled by total assets |
INDUSTRY | Industry dummy to control for industry effects |
YEAR | Year dummy to control for year effects |
For channel analysis | |
B_MEETINGS | Number of board meetings held in a year |
B_M_ATT | The average overall attendance percentage of board meetings |
FEMALE_IND | The proportion of independent female directors |
FEMALE_EXE | The proportion of female executive directors |
F_AUD_COMM | A binary variable equal to 1 if there is at least one female director on the audit committee, 0 otherwise |
F_COMP_COMM | A binary variable equal to 1 if there is at least one female director on the compensation committee, 0 otherwise |
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Nadeem, M. Board Gender Diversity and Managerial Obfuscation: Evidence from the Readability of Narrative Disclosure in 10-K Reports. J Bus Ethics 179, 153–177 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04830-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04830-3
Keywords
- Board gender diversity
- Managerial obfuscation
- Readability
- Stakeholder-agency theory
- Annual reports
JEL Classifications
- M40
- G34
- G14