Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Ideals-Based Accountability and Reputation in Select Family Firms

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We develop a model of ideals-based accountability (IBA) which we have witnessed at work in several long-thriving family businesses. The owners and managers of these firms eschew individualism and materiality in the pursuit of ethical ideals such as supporting democracy and bettering the human condition. Although accountability is to these ideals, not for outcomes such as profitability or even reputation, IBA has resulted in outstanding reputations for some firms. We characterize IBA according to its missions, leadership, culture, and stakeholder relationships. We also contrast it with traditional forms of accountability and differentiate IBA from related stakeholder, stewardship, and CSR perspectives. Finally, we examine its manifestations within five long-lived family enterprises, in the process generating propositions to advance the concept.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. According to Schlenker and Weigold (1989, p. 36) accountability to self “exists when (a) important internalized principles for conduct are salient; (b) actors believe those principles apply to their conduct in the situation, (c) actors take personal responsibility for the implications of their conduct as it relates to those principles; that is they perceive personal control over conduct and related outcomes.”.

  2. Certainly, felt responsibility is to the segment of society served by the ideal; however in no way are those embracing IBA answerable via concrete reporting to any specific person, group or institution.

  3. This happened from 1945 to 1954 at Renault when the French government owned the firm and CEO Pierre Lefaucheux, a hero of the Resistance, embraced the ideal of post-war economic recovery in the French manufacturing sector at considerable personal cost to himself and to Renault short-term profits, but to the great benefit of the French economy (Miller and Sardais 2011).

References

  • Aguilera, R. V. (2005). Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective. British Journal of Management,16(S1), S39–S53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alvesson, M., & Deetz, S. (1996). Critical theory and postmodernism approaches to organizational studies (Chap. 1.7). In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. D. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of organization studies (pp. 191–217). London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ammeter, A. P., Douglas, C., Ferris, G. R., & Goka, H. (2004). A social relationship conceptualization of trust and accountability in organizations. Human Resource Management Review,14(1), 47–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ashforth, B. E., & Pratt, M. G. (2003). Institutionalized spirituality: An oxymoron? (Chap. 6). In R. A. Giacalone & C. L. Jurkiewicz (Eds.), Handbook of workplace spirituality and organizational performance (pp. 93–107). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ashforth, B. E., & Vaidyanath, D. (2002). Work organizations as secular religions. Journal of Management Inquiry,11(4), 359–370.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandura, A. (1982). The self and mechanisms of agency (Chap. 1). In J. Suls (Ed.), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 1, pp. 3–39). Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, G. G., & Dyck, B. (2011). Conventional resource-based theory and its radical alternative: A less materialist-individualist approach to strategy. Journal of Business Ethics,99(1), 121–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennedsen, M., & Van der Heyden, L. (2010). When MBAs meet Henokiens: What can we learn from long-lived family firms? Fontainebleau: INSEAD, Faculty & Research Working Paper 2010/81/EPS/EFE/TOM/WICFE.

  • Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics,80(3), 511–529.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brailsford, T. W. (2001). Building a knowledge community at Hallmark Cards. Research-Technology Management,44(5), 18–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, N. M., & Solomon, J. (2008). Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: An overview. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal,21(7), 885–906.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, M. J., & Miller, D. (2015). Reconceptualizing competitive dynamics: A multidimensional framework. Strategic Management Journal,36(5), 758–775.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coffee, J. C. (2002). Understanding Enron: It’s about the gatekeepers, stupid. The Business Lawyer,57(4), 1403–1420.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crossland, C., & Chen, G. (2013). Executive accountability around the world: Sources of cross-national variation in firm performance—CEO dismissal sensitivity. Strategic Organization,11(1), 78–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review,22(1), 20–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deephouse, D. L., & Jaskiewicz, P. (2013). Do family firms have better reputations than non-family firms? An integration of socioemotional wealth and social identity theories. Journal of Management Studies,50(3), 337–360.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dhiman, A., Sen, A., & Bhardwaj, P. (2018). Effect of self-accountability on self-regulatory behavior: A quasi-experiment. Journal of Business Ethics,148(1), 79–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review,20(1), 65–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, B., & Schroeder, D. (2005). Management, theology and moral points of view: Towards an alternative to the conventional materialist-individualist ideal-type of management. Journal of Management Studies,42(4), 705–735.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, B., & Wong, K. (2010). Corporate spiritual disciplines and the quest for organizational virtue. Journal of Management, Spirituality and Religion,7(1), 7–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dyer, D., & Gross, D. (2001). The generations of Corning: The life and times of a global corporation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elias, R. Z. (2002). Determinants of earnings management ethics among accountants. Journal of Business Ethics,40(1), 33–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy,88(2), 288–307.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fombrun, C. J. (1995). Reputation: Realizing value from the corporate image. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frances-Gomez, P., & del Rio, A. (2008). Stakeholder’s preference and rational compliance: A comment on Sacconi’s ‘CSR as a model for extended corporate governance II: Compliance, reputation and reciprocity. Journal of Business Ethics,82(1), 59–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frink, D. D., Hall, A. T., Perryman, A. A., Ranft, A. L., Hochwarter, W. A., Ferris, G. R., et al. (2008). Meso-level theory of accountability in organizations (Chap. 5). In J. J. Martocchio (Ed.), Research in personnel and human resources management (Vol. 27, pp. 177–245). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frink, D., & Klimoski, R. J. (1998). Toward a theory of accountability in organizations and human resource management. In G. R. Ferris (Ed.), Research in personnel and human resources management (Vol. 16, pp. 1–51)., Stamford JAI: CT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gelfand, M. J., Lim, B. C., & Raver, J. L. (2004). Culture and accountability in organizations: Variations in forms of social control across cultures. Human Resource Management Review,14(1), 135–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., McCollom Hampton, M., & Lansberg, I. (1997). Generation to generation: Life cycles of the family business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham, M. B., & Shuldiner, A. T. (2001). Corning and the craft of innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenleaf, R. K. (1996). Seeker and servant. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habbershon, T. G., & Williams, M. L. (1999). A resource-based framework for assessing the strategic advantages of family firms. Family Business Review,12(1), 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, J. C., & Anderson, C. (1979). When you care enough: The story of Hallmarks cards and its founder. Kansas: Hallmark Cards Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, A. T., Frink, D., & Buckley, M. (2017). An accountability account: A review and synthesis of the theoretical and empirical research on felt accountability. Journal of Organizational Behavior,38(2), 204–224.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, A. T., Zinko, R., Perryman, A. A., & Ferris, G. R. (2009). Organizational citizenship behavior and reputation: Mediators in the relationships between accountability and job performance and satisfaction. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies,15(4), 381–392.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison, S. H., Ashforth, B. E., & Corley, K. G. (2009). Organizational sacralization and sacrilege. Research in organizational behavior,29, 225–254.

    Google Scholar 

  • He, X., Pittman, J., & Rui, O. (2016). Reputational implications for partners after a major audit failure: Evidence from China. Journal of Business Ethics,138(4), 702–722.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huse, M. (2005). Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of Management,16(S1), S65–S79.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, H. S. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International Journal of the Economics of Business,6(1), 41–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics,3(4), 305–360.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. Academy of Management Review,20(2), 404–437.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khandwalla, P. N. (1998). Chapter 8 - Thorny glory: Toward organizational greatness. In S. Srivastva & D. L. Cooperrider (Eds.), Organizational wisdom and executive courage (pp. 157–204). San Francisco: The New Lexington Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koiranen, M. (2002). Over 100 years of age but still entrepreneurially active in business: Exploring the values and family characteristics of old Finnish family firms. Family Business Review,15(3), 175–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraybill, D. B., & Nolt, S. M. (1995). Amish enterprise: From plows to profits. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laufer, W. S. (2003). Social accountability and corporate greenwashing. Journal of Business Ethics,43(3), 253–261.

    Google Scholar 

  • Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2015). Learning stewardship in family firms: For family, by family, across the life cycle. Academy of Management Learning & Education,14(3), 386–399.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lumpkin, G. T., & Brigham, K. H. (2011). Long-term orientation and intertemporal choice in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,35(6), 1149–1169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luo, Y. (2005). How does globalization affect corporate governance and accountability? A perspective from MNEs. Journal of International Management,11(1), 19–41.

    Google Scholar 

  • Madison, K., Holt, D. T., Kellermanns, F. W., & Ranft, A. L. (2016). Viewing family firm behavior and governance through the lens of agency and stewardship theories. Family Business Review,29(1), 65–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meuleman, M., Wright, M., Manigart, S., & Lockett, A. (2009). Private equity syndication: Agency costs, reputation and collaboration. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,36(5–6), 616–644.

    Google Scholar 

  • Michelin, F., Levaï, I., & Messarovitch, Y. (1998). Et pourquoi pas?. Paris: Grasset.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Managing for the long run: Lessons in competitive advantage from great family businesses. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: Agency, stewardship, and capabilities. Family Business Review,19(1), 73–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Scholnick, B. (2008). Stewardship vs. stagnation: An empirical comparison of small family and non-family businesses. Journal of Management Studies,45(1), 51–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D., & Sardais, C. (2011). Angel agents: Agency theory reconsidered. Academy of Management Perspectives,25(2), 6–13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nordstrom, O., & Jennings, J. (2015). How family interactive patterns influence entrepreneurial processes: Insights from the Hutterites. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research,34(12), 1–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peloza, J., White, K., & Shang, J. (2013). Good and guilt-free: The role of self-accountability in influencing preferences for products with ethical attributes. Journal of Marketing,77(1), 104–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pruitt, B. H. (1998). Timken: From Missouri to Mars—A century of leadership in manufacturing. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Redekop, C., Ainlay, S. C., & Siemens, R. (1995). Mennonite entrepreneurs. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reuber, A. R., & Fischer, E. (2010). Organizations behaving badly: When are discreditable actions likely to damage organizational reputation? Journal of Business Ethics,93(1), 39–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richards, M., Zellweger, T., & Gond, J. P. (2017). Maintaining moral legitimacy through worlds and words: An explanation of firms’ investment in sustainability certification. Journal of Management Studies,54(5), 707–710.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richomme-Huet, K., & d’Andria, A. (2012). L’autre gestion des Hénokiens. Une perspective séculaire des entreprises familiales. La Revue des Sciences de Gestion,253, 27–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinette, S., & Brand, C. (2001). Emotion marketing: The hallmark way of winning customers for life. New York: McGraw Hill Professional.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rus, D., van Knippenberg, D., & Wisse, B. (2012). Leader power and self-serving behavior: The moderating role of accountability. The Leadership Quarterly,23(1), 13–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacconi, L. (2007). A social contract account for CSR as an extended model of corporate governance (II): Compliance, reputation and reciprocity. Journal of Business Ethics,75(1), 77–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sageder, M., Mitter, C., & Feldbauer-Durstmüller, B. (2018). Image and reputation of family firms: A systematic literature review of the state of research. Review of Managerial Science,12(1), 335–377.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sampath, V. S., Gardberg, N. A., & Rahman, N. (2016). Corporate reputation’s invisible hand: Bribery, rational choice, and market penalties. Journal of Business Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3242-3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schlenker, B. R., Britt, T. W., Pennington, J., Murphy, R., & Doherty, K. (1994). The triangle model of responsibility. Psychological Review,101(4), 632–652.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlenker, B., & Weigold, M. (1989). Self-identification and accountability (Chap. 2). In R. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Impression management in the organization (pp. 21–42). NJ: L Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solomon, J. (2007). Corporate governance and accountability (3rd ed.). Chichester: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. (2003). Control and collaboration: Paradoxes of governance. Academy of Management Review,28(3), 397–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tift, S. E., & Jones, A. S. (1999). The trust: The private and powerful family behind the New York Times. Boston: Little Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tracey, P. (2012). Religion and organization: A critical review of current trends and future directions. Academy of Management Annals,6(1), 87–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vosselman, E. (2016). Accounting, accountability, and ethics in public sector organizations: Toward a duality between instrumental accountability and relational response-ability. Administration & Society,48(5), 602–627.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walker, K., & Dyck, B. (2014). The primary importance of corporate social responsibility and ethicality in corporate reputation. Business and Society Review,119(1), 147–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weaver, G. R., & Agle, B. R. (2002). Religiosity and ethical behavior in organizations: A symbolic interactionist perspective. Academy of Management Review,27(1), 77–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, M. (1958). The protestant ethic and spirit of capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zellweger, T. (2017). Managing the family business: Theory and practice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chair of Succession and Family Enterprise, Department of Management, HEC Montréal, 3000 Cote-Ste-Catherine Rd., Montréal, QC, Canada

    Isabelle Le Breton-Miller

  2. Center for Research on Organization, Strategy & Governance, HEC Montréal, 3000 Cote-Ste-Catherine Rd., Montréal, QC, Canada

    Danny Miller

Authors
  1. Isabelle Le Breton-Miller
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Danny Miller
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Isabelle Le Breton-Miller.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix 1: Source Materials

Appendix 1: Source Materials

For the present study, we collected information on the five companies whose histories we believed best represented IBA. We had examined 20 other major family firms some of which were just as good examples of IBA and many others that were not. Search was done both on the internet and in used bookstores, and books, journal articles, and trade publications were used, only some of which are listed below. We also conducted interviews with top executives and two top level strategy consultants of Corning and Timken in order to garner insights into the ideals of these firms and their owners, and their manifestation in corporate behavior.

Again, we must reiterate the modest claims of our analysis. We cannot claim that the instances we present of IBA will inevitably have the manifestations and outcomes we describe. The case examples are given to illustrate the various components of our theorizing (or perspective). They are in no way a test of that perspective.

Information on Corning was taken from interviews with former CEO and Chairman (retired 2007) James Houghton, Mike Beer, a former top manager of Human Resources, articles on the company, and books by:

  • Dyer, D., & Gross, D. (2001). The generations of Corning: The life and times of a global corporation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press;

  • Gillis, J. (2001). Corning’s latest reinvention: Glass firm enters the uncertain gene-chip market. Washington Post, May 9, E1;

  • Graham, M.B., & Shuldiner, A.T. (2001). Corning and the craft of innovation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.


Information on Hallmark was taken from:

  • Brailsford, T.W. (2001). Building a knowledge community at Hallmark Cards. Research-Technology Management, 44(5), 18–25;

  • Culhane, J. (1974). Roses are red, some verses are blue; There’s plenty of money in ‘I love you’. The New York Times Magazine, 10–11;

  • Dutton, G. (1996). Enhancing creativity. Management Review, 85(11), 44–46.

  • Hall, J.C., & Anderson, C. (1979). When you care enough: The story of Hallmarks Cards and its founder. Hallmark Cards;

  • Loon Hoe, S. (2006). The boundary spanner’s role in organizational learning: unleashing untapped potential. Development and Learning in Organizations: An International Journal, 20(5), 9–11;

  • Papson, S. (1986). From symbolic exchange to bureaucratic discourse: The Hallmark greeting card. Theory, Culture & Society, 3(2), 99–111.


Information on Michelin was taken from:

  • Amdur, K.E. (1998). Paternalism, productivism, collaborationism: Employers and society in interwar and Vichy France. International Labor and Working-Class History, 53, 137–163;

  • Ball, R. (1974). The Michelin man rolls into Akron’s backyard. Fortune, 90(6): 138–143;

  • Browning, E.S. (1990). On a roll: Long-term thinking and paternalistic ways carry michelin to top. Wall Street Journal, January 5, A1;

  • Gueslin, A. (1993). Les hommes du pneu. Les ouvriers Michelin à Clermont-Ferand (1889–1940). Paris, FR: Éditions de l’Atelier;

  • Gueslin, A. (1999). Les hommes du pneu. Les ouvriers Michelin (1940–1980). Paris, FR: Éditions de l’Atelier/Les Éditions Ouvrières;

  • Harp, S. (2001) Marketing Michelin. Johns Hopkins Press;

  • Joly, H. (2008). Diriger une grande entreprise française au XXe siècle: modes de gouvernance, trajectoires et recrutement (Doctoral dissertation, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS);

  • Lauer, S. (2001). Michelin finit par dévoiler sa machine ‘révolutionnaire’: Le ‘C3 M’, entièrement automatisé, permettrait de quadrupler les cadences. Le Monde, September 22, 24;

  • Laux, J.M. (1976). In first gear: The French automobile industry to 1914. McGill-Queen’s University Press-MQUP;

  • Michelin, F., Levaï, I., & Messarovitch, Y. (1998). Et pourquoi pas? Paris, FR: Grasset;

  • The Economist. (1997). Michelin Gets a Grip. The Economist, 342, no. 8006, March 1, 63–64.


Information on The New York Times was taken from:

  • Corry, J. (1993). My Times: Adventures in the news trade. New York, NY: Putnam Pub Group;

  • Frankel, M. (1999). The times of my life and my life with The Times. New York, NY: Random House;

  • Goulden, J.C. (1988). Fit to print: AM Rosenthal and his Times. New York, NY: Lyle Stuart;

  • Salisbury, H.E. (1980). Without fear or favor: An uncompromising look at The New York Times. New York, NY: Times Books;

  • Talese, G. (1969). The kingdom and the power: Behind the scenes at The New York Times: The institution that influences the world. New York, NY: World Pub. Co.;

  • Tift, S.E., & Jones, A.S. (1999). The trust: The private and powerful family behind the New York Times. Boston, MA: Little Brown.


Information on Timken was taken from books, articles, and interviews with two former strategy consultants including:

  • Lubinski, C. (2012). “Fighting Friction: Henry Timken and the Tapered Roller Bearing (1831–1909)”, In Hausman, W.J. (Ed.). Immigrant Entrepreneurship: German-American Business Biographies, 1720 to the Present, vol. 2. German Historical Institute (https://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org/entry.php?rec=28Cite);

  • Pruitt, B. H. (1998). Timken: From Missouri to Mars—A century of leadership in manufacturing. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D. Ideals-Based Accountability and Reputation in Select Family Firms. J Bus Ethics 163, 183–196 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04225-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04225-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation