Skip to main content

Discussion of “An Examination of the U.S. Public Accounting Profession’s Public Interest Discourse and Actions in Federal Policy Making”

Abstract

The history of the public accounting profession is filled with perceived crises in professionalism. Baudot et al. (An examination of the U.S. public accounting profession’s public interest discourse and actions in federal policy making, 2015) focus on the post Sarbanes–Oxley period, highlighting how the advocacy efforts of the public accounting profession directed toward financial regulation represent the most recent of crises. This study makes an important contribution to the literature because it illustrates the inherent challenges faced by a regulatory structure that requires private interests to act in the public good. The purpose of this commentary is to provide a historical and institutional context for the study’s findings, to assess the current state of research, and to offer suggestions for future research.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

References

  1. Allen, A., Ramanna, K., & Roychowdhury, S. (2015). Auditor lobbying on accounting standards. Working paper, Harvard University and Boston College.

  2. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. (1972). Report on the study of establishment of accounting principles: Establishing financial accounting standards.

  3. Baloria, V. P., & Klassen, K. J. (2015). Supporting tax policy change through accounting discretion: Evidence from the 2012 elections. Working paper, Boston College and University of Waterloo.

  4. Barrick, J. A., & Alexander, R. M. (2015). Tax lobbying and corporate political activity: How do firms seek tax relief? Working paper, Brigham Young University and Washington and Lee University.

  5. Baudot, L., Roberts, R. W., & Wallace, D. M. (2015). An examination of the U.S. public accounting professions public interest discourse and actions in federal policy making. Working paper, University of Central Florida.

  6. Correia, M. M. (2014). Political connections and SEC enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 57, 241–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Dwyer, P. D., & Roberts, R. W. (2004). Known by the company you keep: An analysis of the US public accounting profession’s financial contributions to legislators’ election campaigns. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 15, 8665–8883.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Heese, J., Krishnan, R., & Moers, F. (2015). Regulatory leniency and mispricing in beneficent nonprofits. Working paper, Harvard University, Michigan State University and Maastricht University.

  9. Kinney, W. R. (1986). Audit technology and preferences for auditing standards. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8, 73–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Mehta, M., & Zhao, W. (2015). U.S. congressional committees and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct. Working Paper, University of Michigan and Southern Illinois University.

  11. Puro, M. (1984). Audit firm lobbying before the Financial Accounting Standards Board: An empirical study. Journal of Accounting Research, 22, 624–646.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Ramanna, K. (2015). Political standards: Accounting for legitimacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  13. Roberts, R. W., & Bobek, D. D. (2004). The politics of tax accounting in the United States: Evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 565–590.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Roberts, R. W., Dwyer, P. D., & Sweeney, J. T. (2003). Political strategies used by the US public accounting profession during auditor liability reform: The case of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22, 433–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Thornburg, S., & Roberts, R. W. (2008). Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, 229–248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Watts, R., & Zimmerman, J. (1982). Auditors and the determination of accounting standards. Working Paper, University of Rochester and MIT.

  17. Yu, F., & Yu, X. (2011). Corporate lobbying and fraud detection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46, 1865–1891.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Zeff, S. (2003a). How the US accounting profession got where it is today: Part I. Accounting Horizons, 17, 189–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Zeff, S. (2003b). How the US accounting profession got where it is today: Part II. Accounting Horizons, 17, 267–286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vishal P. Baloria.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Baloria, V.P. Discussion of “An Examination of the U.S. Public Accounting Profession’s Public Interest Discourse and Actions in Federal Policy Making”. J Bus Ethics 142, 221–224 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3143-5

Download citation

Keywords

  • Federal policy making
  • Public accounting firms
  • Lobbying