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Wealth Effects of Rare Earth Prices and China’s Rare Earth Elements Policy

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Abstract

Rare earth elements (REEs) have become increasingly important because of their relative scarcity and worldwide increasing demand, as well as China’s quasi-monopoly of this market. REEs are virtually not substitutable, and they are essential for a variety of high-tech products and modern key technologies. This has raised serious concerns that China will misuse its dominant position to set export quotas in order to maximize its own profits at the expense of other rare earth user industries (wealth transfer motive). In fact, export restrictions on REEs were the catalyst for the U.S. to lodge a formal complaint against China in 2012 at the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper analyzes possible wealth transfer effects by focusing on export quota announcements (the so-called MOFCOM announcements) by China, and the share price reactions of Chinese REE suppliers, the U.S. REE users, and the rest of the world REE refiners. Overall, we find limited support for the view of a wealth transfer in connection with MOFCOM announcements only when disentangling events prior to and post the initiation of the WTO trial, consistent with the trial triggering changes to China’s REE policy and recent announcement to abolish quotas. We do find, however, that extreme REE price movements have a first-order effect on all companies in the REE industry consistent with recent market trends to enable hedging against REE price volatility.

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Notes

  1. Deng Xiaoping was the “de facto leader” in China from 1979–1997. See Baotou National Rare Earth Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone (2013).

  2. Premier of the State Council of China, 2003–2013.

  3. A Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture (CJV) is a joint venture between a Chinese and a foreign company within the territory of China. The Chinese company usually provides the labor, land use rights, and factory buildings; the foreign company is required to contribute the necessary technology and key equipment, as well as capital.

  4. The quotas are as follows: December 27, 2011: 9095 t (L) and 1451 t (H); May 17, 2012: 9500 t (L) and 1190 t (H); August 22, 2012: 8537 t (L) and 1233 t (H); December 28, 2012: 13,561 t (L) and 1938 t (H). L: light rare earth elements; H: heavy rare earth elements; t: tons.

  5. Accessible via https://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp.

  6. We decompose the sample of the U.S. companies by industry by using Fama–French industry codings based on forty-eight industries obtained from the companies’ SIC codes. The decomposition reveals that only 2.58 % of the sample companies are classified as either “Precious Metals” or “Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining.” This implies that our sample of the U.S. companies consists of firms located further to the end of the supply chain, i.e., REE users. As a robustness check, we excluded these firms, and obtained virtually identical results. The tables are available from the authors upon request. Industry classifications are from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_48_ind_port.html.

  7. We examined whether the detected extreme price events coincide with the thirteen MOFCOM announcements in Table 1, and find that none of the ± 1.5- or ± 2-standard deviation extreme price events took place at the same time. For ± 1-standard deviation extreme price events, we found there were two MOFCOM announcements two and three days before we recorded the extreme price event. To determine whether those events alter our results, we reran the event studies for the extreme price events defined by ± 1-standard deviation excluding those two events. Our results were virtually the same.

  8. Note that we found no events of extreme price reductions on the lower bound.

  9. In total there are 65 regressions, which is for 13 MOFCOM events times five event windows.

  10. Detailed tables including the coefficients of all control variables are available from the authors upon request.

  11. An enlarged table including the coefficients of the control variables is available in the Online Appendix (see Table OA9).

  12. Note again that the table containing the coefficients of the control variables can be accessed in the online appendix. Please see Table OA9.

Abbreviations

AR:

Abnormal return

CAR:

Cumulative abnormal return

CAAR:

Cumulative average abnormal return

CD:

Compact disk

Ce:

Cerium

CJV:

Cooperative joint venture

CNY:

Chinese yuan

CRSP:

Center for Research in Security Prices

CSMAR:

China Stock Market Trading Database

Dy:

Dysprosium

Er:

Erbium

etc.:

et cetera

Eu:

Europium

EU:

European Union

EWI:

Equally weighted index

FE:

Fixed effects

FOB:

Free on board

GATT:

General agreement on tariffs and trade

Gd:

Gadolinium

Ho:

Holmium

JV:

Joint venture

Kg:

Kilogram

La:

Lanthanum

Lu:

Lutetium

Na:

Not available

Na:

Not applicable

Nd:

Neodymium

NeFeB:

Neodymium iron boron

Max:

Maximum

Min:

Minimum

MRI:

Magnetic resonance imaging

MOFCOM:

Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China

Nobs:

Number of observations

OLS:

Ordinary least squares

Pr:

Praseodymium

Pm:

Promethium

REE:

Rare earth element

ROE:

Return on Equity

Sc:

Scandium

Sm:

Samarium

SmCo:

Samarium cobalt

Std. Dev.:

Standard deviation

TMR:

Technology Metals Research

T:

Metric ton

Tb:

Terbium

Tm:

Thulium

TV:

Television

U.S.:

United States

USD:

U.S. dollar

USGS:

U.S. geological survey

UWI:

Usage-weighted index

WSJ:

Wall street journal

WTO:

World Trade Organization

Y:

Yttrium

Yb:

Ytterbium

Z:

Atomic number

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Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to editors of the special issue “Business Ethics in Greater China” and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments. The authors thank Harald Elsner, Mike Gilroy, Gareth Hatch, Wenxuan Hou, Dudley Kingsnorth, Juliane Proelss, Milena Petrova, Craig Wilson, Mark Schopf, and Heike Schreckenberg, as well as the participants of the Journal of Business Ethics Special Issue Conference on Business Ethics in Greater China: Past, Present, and Future and the 12th INFINITI Conference on International Finance for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are ours.

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Correspondence to Denis Schweizer.

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Müller, M., Schweizer, D. & Seiler, V. Wealth Effects of Rare Earth Prices and China’s Rare Earth Elements Policy. J Bus Ethics 138, 627–648 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2773-3

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