Abstract
The normative foundations of the investor centered model of corporate governance, represented in mainstream economics by the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm, have come under attack, mainly by proponents of normative stakeholder theory. We argue that the nexusof- contracts view is static and limited due to its assumption of price-output certainty. We attempt a synthesis of the nexus-of-contracts and the Knightian views, which provides novel insights into the normative adequacy of the investor-centered firm. Implications for scholarship and management practice follow from our discussion.
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S. Ramakrishna (Rama) Velamuri is Assistant Professor at IESE Business School, where he teaches Entrepreneurship and Negotiation in the MBA and executive education programs. He is also a visiting professor at the Indian School of Business in India, the University of Saarland in Germany, and the University of Piura in Peru. His research has been published in both academic and practitioner outlets: Journal of Business Venturing, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures (forthcoming), Universia Business Review, Financial Times Mastering Management Series, The Hindu, Business Line, Actualidad Economica, La Vanguardia, and Diario Financiero (Chile). He has also contributed several book chapter on enterpreneurship and strategy. He received a B.Com. degree from the University of Madras, an MBA from IESE Business School, and a Ph.D. from the Darden Graduate School of Business, University of Virginia.
Sankaran Venkataraman (Venkat) is the MasterCard Professor of Business Administration at the Darden Graduate School of Business Adminstration, University of Virginia, where he teaches MBA and executive level courses in strategy and entrepreneurship. He also serves as the Director of Research of the Batten Institute and is the Editor of the Journal of Business Venturing. He consults with Fortune 500 firms as well as several small companies. He is advisor to firms, universities and government organizations. He is a speaker for and advisor to the Entrepreneurial Forum, a program of the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce aimed at promoting trade through entrepreneurship around the world. He received his M.A. in Economics from the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, India; his MBA from the Indian Institute of Management (Calcutta); and his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota.
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Velamuri, S.R., Venkataraman, S. Why Stakeholder And Stockholder Theories Are Not Necessarily Contradictory: A Knightian Insight. J Bus Ethics 61, 249–262 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-4733-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-4733-9