Skip to main content
Log in

Systemic functional adaptedness and domain-general cognition: broadening the scope of evolutionary psychology

  • Published:
Biology & Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Evolutionary psychology tends to be associated with a massively modular cognitive architecture. On this framework of human cognition, an assembly of specialized information processors called modules developed under selection pressures encountered throughout the phylogenic history of hominids. The coordinated activity of domain-specific modules carries out all the processes of belief fixation, abstract reasoning, and other facets of central cognition. Against the massive modularity thesis, I defend an account of systemic functional adaptedness, according to which non-modular systems emerged because of adaptive problems imposed by the intrinsic physiology of the evolving human brain. The proposed reformulation of evolutionary theorizing draws from neural network models and Cummins’ (J Philos 72(20):741–765, 1975) account of systemic functions to identify selection pressures that gave rise to non-modular, domain-general mechanisms in cognitive architecture.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
EUR 32.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or Ebook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The strength of this claim notwithstanding, cases of multifunctional mechanisms and traits arising by means other than natural selection have been documented since Gould and Vrba (1982: 6). Take, for instance, the category of exaptations, which are adaptations that are coopted to serve additional functions, as well as spandrels that emerged as developmental byproducts of adaptations.

  2. Additional concepts relevant to evolutionary psychology are “regulation,” “computational architecture,” “organization,” “design,” “entropy,” “replication,” “by-product,” and “task environment” (see Cosmides and Tooby 1987 for an overview).

  3. Describing modules as computational systems equivocates between two senses of computation (Samuels 1998: 579). Modules may carry out computations under either the hardware conception or the algorithm conception (Jungé and Dennett 2010). In the hardware sense, modules are localized in specific brain regions. On the latter interpretation, modules as specialized sub-routines or mental programs—on this account modules could be implemented across discontinuous neural regions (see Samuels 1998: 579). The massive modularity thesis critiqued in this paper refers to the more mainstream algorithmic construal of modularity posited by Carruthers (2006) and Sperber (2004).

  4. According to Fodor’s original formulation (1983), modules are: (1) localized, (2) subject to characteristic breakdowns, (3) mandatory, (4) fast, (5) shallow, (6) ontogenetically determined, (7) domain specific, (8) inaccessible, and (9) informationally encapsulated.

  5. Some modularists, including Carruthers (2013a, b), as well as Cosmides and Tooby (2000), regard the strong MM thesis as compatible with there being some mechanisms, such as working memory, that exhibit domain-general functionality. Nevertheless, the overarching framework of MM maintains that central cognition is predominantly constituted by domain-specific modules (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 1171, 1261).

  6. MM theorists differ on the assignment of roles to the modules that govern central cognition. According to Carruthers’s (2006) MM framework the language content-integrator is a higher-order module that performs complex cognitive operations, whereas on Sperber’s (1994, 2000) account the metarepresentation module plays a similar role.

  7. In his review of What Darwin Got Wrong, Godfrey-Smith (2010) points out how Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) describe factors of the internal structure of the organism playing a role in determining which adaptations emerge.

  8. Carruthers (2006), for instance, proposes that working memory or the global workspace satisfies this role. On this account, neither of these mechanisms perform cognitive operations, but rather relay information to modules. On Sperber’s account (1994, 2000) the metarepresentational module correspond to higher-order modules that traffics information among modular systems.

  9. Connecting the present analysis of central cognition with theories of consciousness, it would be worth exploring further whether the cortical regions undergirded by rich club/hub cores also instantiate a global neuronal workspace (see Baars 1997, 1998, 2002). Following up on this question is beyond the purview of the present discussion, but further investigation may prove worthwhile.

  10. What needs to be determined is whether this commensurate scaling up of neural integration and cognitive complexity is a linear or non-linear relation. While I do not address such concerns here, these details could be ascertained through further investigation and development of the proposed framework.

References

  • Amundson R, Lauder G (1994) Function without purpose: the uses of causal role function inevolutionary biology. Biol Philos 9(4):443–469

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson ML, Penner-Wilger M (2013) Neural reuse in the evolution and development of the brain: evidence for developmental homology? Dev Psychobiol 55(1):42–51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson ML, Pessoa L (2011) Quantifying the diversity of neural activations in individual brain regions. In: Carlson L, Hölscher C, Shipley T (eds) Proceedings of the 33rd annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society, Austin, pp 2421–2426

    Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson A, Wheeler M (2003) Evolutionary psychology’s grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning. In: Over D (ed) Evolution and the psychology of reasoning: the debate. Psychology Press, Hove, pp 61–99

    Google Scholar 

  • Baars B (1997) In the theater of conciousness. Oxford University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baars B (1998) A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Baars B (2002) The conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence. Trends Cogn Sci 6(1):47–52

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Badre D, D’Esposito M (2009) Is the rostro-caudal axis of the frontal lobe hierarchical? Nat Rev Neurosci 10:659–669

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baggio HC, Segura B, Junque C, de Reus MA, Sala-Llonch R, van den Heuvel MP (2015) Rich club organization and cognitive performance in healthy older participants. J Cogn Neurosci 27(9):1801–1810

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett CH (2012) A hierarchical model of the evolution of human brain specialization. PNAS 109(1):10733–10740

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett CH (2015) The shape of thought: how mental adaptations evolve. Oxford University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bola M, Sabel BA (2015) Dynamic reorganization of brain functional networks during cognition. NeuroImage 144:398–413

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boureau Y, Sokol-Hessner P, Daw ND (2015) Deciding how to decide: self-control and meta decision making. Trends Cogn Sci 19(11):700–710

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyer P (2015) How natural selection shapes conceptual structure. In: Margolis E, Lawrence S (eds) The conceptual mind: new directions in the study of concepts. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 185–200

    Google Scholar 

  • Brewer B (1999) Perception and reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Buller D (2005) Adapting minds: evolutionary psychology and the persistent quest for human nature. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bullmore E, Sporns O (2009) Complex brain networks: graph theoretical analysis of structural and functional systems. Nat Rev Neurosci 10:186–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bullmore E, Sporns O (2012) The economy of brain network organization. Nat Rev Neurosci 13(5):336–349

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bunge SA, Wendelken C, Badre D, Wagner AD (2005) Analogical reasoning and prefrontal cortex: evidence for separable retrieval and integration mechanisms. Cereb Cortex 15(3):239–249

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buss D (1995) Evolutionary psychology: a new paradigm for psychological science. Psychol Enquiry 6(1):1–30

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buss D (2005) The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Wiley, Hoboken

    Google Scholar 

  • Caramazza A, Shelton J (1998) Domain-specific knowledge systems in the brain: the animate inanimate distinction. J Cogn Neurosci 10:1–34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2004) The mind is a system of modules shaped by natural selection. In: Hitchcock C (ed) Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Wiley Blackwell, Upper Saddle River, pp 293–311

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2006) The case for massively modular models of mind. In: Stainton RJ (ed) Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Wiley-Blackwell, Upper Saddle River, pp 3–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2013a) On central cognition. Philos Stud 170(1):143–162

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2013b) Evolution of working memory. PNAS 110(2):10371–10378

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chklovskii DB, Koulakov AA (2004) Maps in the brain: what can we learn from them? Annu Rev Neurosci 27:369–392

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cocchi L, Zalesky A, Fornito A, Mattingley JB (2013) Dynamic cooperation and competition between brain systems during cognitive control. Trends Cogn Sci 17(10):493–501

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen JR, D’Esposito M (2016) The segregation and integration of distinct brain networks and their relationship to cognition. J Neurosci 36:12083–12094

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole MW, Reynolds JR, Power JD, Repovs G, Anticevic A, Braver TS (2013) Multi-task connectivity reveals flexible hubs for adaptive task control. Nat Neurosci 16:1348–1355

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L (1989) The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition 31(3):187–276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L, Tooby J (1994) Origins of domain specificity: the evolution of functional organization. In: Hirschfield LA, Gelman S (eds) Mapping the mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 85–116

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L, Tooby J (1997a) The modular nature of human intelligence. In: Scheibel A, Schopf JW (eds) The origins and evolution of intelligence. Jones and Bartlett Publishers, Cambridge, pp 71–101

    Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L, Tooby J (1997b) Dissecting the computational architecture of social inference mechanisms. Ciba Found Symp 208:132–156

    Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L, Tooby J (2000) The cognitive neuroscience of social reasoning. In: Gazzaniga MS (ed) The new cognitive neurosciences, 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 1259–1270

    Google Scholar 

  • Cummins R (1975) Functional analysis. J Philos 72(20):741–765

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davies PS (2000) The nature of natural norms: why selected functions are systemic capacity functions. Nous 34(1):85–107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davies PS, Fetzer J, Foster T (1995) Logical reasoning and domain specificity—a critique of the social exchange theory of reasoning. Biol Philos 10(1):1–37

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Reus MA, van den Heuvel MP (2013) Rich club organization and intermodule communication in the cat connectome. J Neurosci 33(32):12929–12939

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Reus MA, van den Heuvel MP (2014) Simulated rich club lesioning in brain networks: a scaffold for communication and integration? Front Hum Neurosci 8(647):1–5

    Google Scholar 

  • Dehaene S, Changeux JP (2011) Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron 70:200–227

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Desimone R, Duncan J (1995) Neural mechanisms of selective attention. Annu Rev Neurosci 18:193–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duncan J (2010) The multiple-demand (MD) system of the primate brain: mental programs for intelligent behaviour. Trends Cogn Sci 14:172–179

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elman JL, Bates EA, Johnson MH, Karmiloff-Smith A, Parisi D, Plunkett K (1996) Rethinking innateness: a connectionist perspective on development. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans G (1982) The varieties of reference. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Fawcett TW, Fallenstein B, Higginson AD, Houston AI, Mallpress D, Trimmer PC, McNamara JM (2014) The evolution of decision rules in complex environments. Trends Cogn Sci 18(3):153–161

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fedorenko E (2014) The role of domain-general cognitive control in language comprehension. Front Neurosci 5(335):1–17

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J (1983) The modularity of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J (1994) Concepts: a potboiler. Cognition 50:95–113

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J (2000) The mind doesn’t work that way. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J, Lepore E (1996) The red herring and the pet fish: why concepts still can’t be prototypes. Cognition 58:253–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J, Piattelli-Palmarini M (2010) What Darwin got wrong. Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Fox PT, Laird AR, Fox SP, Fox M, Uecker AM, Crank M, Lancaster JL (2005) BrainMap taxonomy of experimental design: description and evaluation. Hum Brain Mapp 25:185–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuster J (2008) The prefrontal cortex, 4th edn. Academic Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer G, Hug K (1992) Domain-specific reasoning: social contracts, cheating, and perspective change. Cognition 43:127–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (1986) Complexity and the function of mind in nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2010) It got eaten. Lond Rev Books 32(13):29–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2013) Philosophy of biology. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman-Rakic PS (1995) Cellular basis of working memory. Neuron 14:477–485

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gould SJ, Vrba ES (1982) Exaptation—a missing term in the science of form. Paleobiology 8(1):4–15

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grayson DS, Ray S, Carpenter S, Iyer S, Costa Dias TG, Stevens C, Nigg JT, Fair DA (2014) Structural and functional rich club organization of the brain in children and adults. PLoS ONE 9(2):e88297

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green M (2016) Expressing, showing, and representing. In: Abel C, Smith J (eds) Emotional expression: philosophical, psychological, and legal perspectives. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 1–24

    Google Scholar 

  • Hagoort P (2005) On Broca, brain and binding: a new framework. Trends Cogn Sci 9:416–423

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman G (1986) Change in view: principles of reasoning. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Harriger L, van den Heuvel MP, Sporns O (2012) Rich club organization of macaque cerebral cortex and its role in network communication. PLoS 7:e46497

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herculano-Houzel S (2016) The human advantage: a new understanding of how our brain became remarkable. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Holyoak K (2012) Analogy and relational reasoning. In: Holyoak KJ, Morrison RG (eds) The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 234–259

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hurley S (2006) Making sense of animals. In: Hurley S, Nudds M (eds) Rational animals?. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Janata P, Grafton ST (2003) Swinging in the brain: shared neural substrates for behaviors related to sequencing in music. Nat Neurosci 6:682–687

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jungé JA, Dennett DC (2010) Multi-use and constraints from original use. Behav Brain Sci 33:277–278

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaiser M, Hilgetag CC (2006) Nonoptimal component placement, but short processing paths, due to long-distance projections in neural systems. PLoS Comput Biol 2:e95

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karmiloff-Smith A (1992) Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitzbichler MG, Henson RNA, Smith ML, Nathan PJ, Bullmore ET (2011) Cognitive effort drives workspace configuration of human brain functional networks. J Neurosci 31(22):8259–8270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koechlin E, Ody C, Kouneiher F (2003) The architecture of cognitive control in the human prefrontal cortex. Science 302:1181–1185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krawczyk D (2010) The cognition and neuroscience of relational reasoning. Brain Res 1428:13–23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krawczyk D (2018) Reasoning: the neuroscience of how we think. Elsevier, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Liang X, Hsu LM, Lu H, Sumiyoshi A, He Y, Yang Y (2017) The rich-club organization in rat functional brain network to balance between communication cost and efficiency. Cereb Cortex 28:924–935

    Google Scholar 

  • Luria AR (1966) Higher cortical functions in man. B. Haigh (trans.). Basic Books, New York

  • Michel M (2017) A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. Conscious Cogn 49:333–346

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller EK, Cohen JD (2001) An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annu Rev Neurosci 24:167–202

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mithen S (1996) The prehistory of the mind. Thames and Hudson Ltd, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Nettle D (2007) A module for metaphor? The site of imagination in the architecture of the mind. Proc Br Acad 147:259–274

    Google Scholar 

  • Persons WS, Currie PJ (2015) Bristles before down: a new perspective on the functional origin of feathers. Evolution 69:857–862

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petersen SE, Posner MI (2012) The attention system of the human brain: 20 years after. Annu Rev Neurosci 35:73–89

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pinker S (1997) How the mind works. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner MI, Petersen SE (1990) The attention system of the human brain. Annu Rev Neurosci 13:25–42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz J (2006) Is the mind really modular? In: Stainton RJ (ed) Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Wiley-Blackwell, Upper Saddle River, pp 22–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Quartz SR, Sejnowski TJ (1997) The neural basis of cognitive development: a constructivist manifesto. Behav Brain Sci 20(4):537–556

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosch E (1978) Principles of categorization. In: Roach E, Lloyd B (eds) Cognition and categorization. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Upper Saddle River, pp 27–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuels R (1998) Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. Br J Philos Sci 49:575–602

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scannell JW, Blakemore C, Young MP (1995) Analysis of connectivity in the cat cerebral cortex. J Neurosci 15:1463–1483

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schulz A (2008) Structural flaws: massive modularity and the argument form design. Br J Philos Sci 59:733–743

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Senden M, Deco G, de Reus MA, Goebel R, van den Heuvel MP (2014) Rich club organization supports a diverse set of functional network configurations. NeuroImage 96:174–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Senden M, Reuter N, van den Heuvel MP, Goebel R, Deco G (2017) Cortical rich club regions can organize state-dependent functional network formation by engaging in oscillatory behavior. NeuroImage 146:561–574

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shine JM, Bissett PG, Bell PT, Oluwasanmi K, Balsters JH, Gorgolewski KJ, Moodie CA, Poldrack RA (2016) The dynamics of functional brain networks: integrated network states during cognitive task performance. Neuron 92:1–11

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sober E (1984) The nature of selection: evolutionary theory in philosophical focus. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D (1994) The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In: Hischfield LA, Gelman SA (eds) Mapping the mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 39–67

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D (2000) Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In: Sperber D (ed) Metarepresentations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 117–137

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D (2002) In defense of massive modularity. In: Dupoux E (ed) Language, brain, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 47–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D (2004) Modularity and relevance: how can a massively modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive? In: Carruthers P, Laurence S, Stich S (eds) The innate mind: structure and content. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 53–68

    Google Scholar 

  • Sporns O (2010) Networks of the brain. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sporns O (2012) Discovering the human connectome. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sporns O (2013) Network attributes for segregation and integration in the human brain. Curr Opin Neurobiol 23:162–171

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny K, Griffiths PE (1999) Sex and death: an introduction to philosophy of biology. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Symons D (1992) On the use and misuse of Darwinism in the study of human behavior. In: Barkow JH, Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds) The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 137–159

    Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J, Cosmides L (1987) Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. In: Buss DM (ed) Handbook of evolutionary psychology. Wiley, Hoboken

    Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J, Cosmides L (1992) The psychological foundations of culture. In: Barkow JH, Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds) The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 19–136

    Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J, Cosmides L (1995) Foreword in Baron-Cohen S, Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp xi–xviii

    Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J, Cosmides L (2000) Toward mapping the evolved functional organization of mind and brain. In: Gazzaniga MS (ed) The new cognitive neurosciences, 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 1167–1178

    Google Scholar 

  • Uddin LQ (2015) Salience processing and insular cortical function and dysfunction. Nat Rev Neurosci 16(1):55–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Unsworth N, Robison MK (2017) A locus coeruleus-norepinephrine account of individual differences in working memory capacity and attention control. Psychon Bull Rev 24(4):1282–1311

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uttal WR (2001) The new phrenology: the limits of localizing cognitive processes in the brain. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Van den Heuvel MP, Sporns O (2011) Rich-club organization of the human connectome. J Neurosci 31:15775–15786

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van den Heuvel MP, Sporns O (2013) An anatomical substrate for integration among functional networks in human cortex. J Neurosci 33(36):14489–14500

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van den Heuvel MP, Kahn R, Goñi J, Sporns O (2012) High-cost, high-capacity backbone for global brain communication. PNAS 109(28):11372–11377

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vincent JL, Kahn I, Snyder AZ, Raichle ME, Buckner RL (2008) Evidence for a frontoparietal control system revealed by intrinsic functional connectivity. J Neurophysiol 100(6):3328–3342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weiskopf D (2010) Concepts and the modularity of thought. Dialectica 64(1):107–130

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weiskopf D (2014) The architecture of higher thought. In: Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in philosophy of mind. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 242–261

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Weiskopf D (2016) Integrative modeling and the role of neural constraints. Philos Sci Arch 83(5):675–685

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodward J, Cowie F (2004) The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selection. In: Hitchcock C (ed) Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Wiley-Blackwell, Upper Saddle River, pp 312–334

    Google Scholar 

  • Yue Q, Martin R, Fischer-Baum S, Ramos Nuńez A, Ye F, Deem M (2017) Brain modularity mediates the relation between task complexity and performance. J Cogn Neurosci 9:1532–1546

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora-Lòpez G, Zhou C, Kurths J (2009) Graph analyses of cortical networks reveals complex anatomical communication substrate. Chaos 19(1):015117

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zamora-Lòpez G, Zhou C, Kurths J (2011) Exploring brain function from anatomical connectivity. Front Neurosci 5(83):1–11

    Google Scholar 

  • Zeman A, Obst O, Brooks KR, Rich AN (2013) The Müller-Lyer illusion in a computational model of biological object recognition. PLoS ONE 8(2):e56126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zerilli J (2017) Against the “system” module. Philos Psychol 30(3):235–250

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Daniel Weiskopf, Neil Van Leeuwen, Andrea Scarantino, David Washburn, Daniel Krawczyk, and Matthias Michel for valuable feedback on previous drafts. Much appreciation also goes to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive commentary. The points raised in their assessments significantly benefitted the revised manuscript.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Lundie.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lundie, M. Systemic functional adaptedness and domain-general cognition: broadening the scope of evolutionary psychology. Biol Philos 34, 8 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9670-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9670-6

Keywords

Navigation