Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 299–310 | Cite as

Biology and Philosophy symposium on Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World

Response to critics
Book Symposium


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

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