Abstract
A number of scholars have recently defended the claim that there is a close connection between the evolutionary biological notion of fitness and the economic notion of utility: both are said to refer to an organism’s success in dealing with its environment, and both are said to play the same theoretical roles in their respective sciences. However, an analysis of two seemingly disparate but in fact structurally related phenomena—‘niche construction’ (the case where organisms change their environment to make it fit to their needs) and ‘adaptive preferences’ (the case where agents change their wants to make them fit to what the world has given them)—shows that one needs to be very careful about the postulation of this sort of fitness–utility connection. Specifically, I here use the analysis of these two phenomena to establish when connecting fitness and utility is and is not possible.
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Notes
Note that the term ‘adaptive preferences’ is sometimes reserved for ‘bad’ (theoretically unacceptable) kinds of adaptive preference changes, and the term ‘character planning’ for ‘good’ (theoretically acceptable) ones (Elster 1983; Bovens 1992; Bruckner 2009). I return to this distinction below; for now it is just important to note that I shall be using the term ‘adaptive preferences’ in a wider sense that comprises both good and bad versions.
Note that the different ways of connecting evolutionary biology and economics are not completely separate, in that the same authors often pursue multiple such projects at the same time (see e.g. Trimmer et al. 2011; Alexander and Jason 2009). This, though, does not imply that there is no use in discussing the fitness–utility connection on its own—it is still based on a distinctive set of argumentative considerations.
In what follows, I shall switch between talking about the fitness of traits and that of organisms. While, in general, these two are not interchangeable (Sober 2000, chap. 3), for present purposes, conflating these is not problematic: I focus on only one trait per organism, so that the two come out to be the same here.
Note that this is different from the claim that natural selection maximizes the average fitness in the population. The latter claim is widely known to be true only in special cases (e.g. in the absence of frequency dependent selection or altruistic traits). What (NS) claims is merely that, at any given time, the fittest available trait is selected; which trait that is can change over time. Note also that (NS) should be seen to concern net fitness: there might be two (even opposing) effects on fitness—e.g. one via the individual level and one via the group level. Here, though, only the net effect matters (for more on this, see Okasha 2006).
Note that, as formulated above, (EA) fits most easily to a framework of certainty. However, the extension to the case of ‘risk’ is straightforward. See also below.
Note that these examples are just meant to provide a flavor of the issues; there is much more to be said about them.
Note that this leaves room for debate about exactly how the risk aversion is to be taken into account in economics—e.g. with non-linear utility functions or in some other way (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Note also that there is more to risk than variance—though variance is often taken to be a key feature and measure of risk (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). I thank Don Ross for useful discussion of this point.
Another reason for doubting claim (b) has been suggested to lie in the fact that fitnesses are interpersonally comparable, while utilities are not (see e.g. Alexander 2007, 2009; Okasha 2011; Gruene-Yanoff 2011). As will be made clearer in what follows, I think this criticism indeed gets at important issues, but stops short of fully illuminating the differences between fitness and utility. Bringing this out is the aim of the rest of this paper.
It will reach the global optimum with probability approaching 1 only as the population size reaches infinity.
Note that, in what follows, I shall also not appeal to there being more to evolution than natural selection, or there being more to economic agency than utility maximization (see e.g. Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). The point here is that there are issues that create difficulties for attempts at connecting fitness and utility that are inherent to the structure of these notions—independently of their importance in evolutionary biology and economics.
Interestingly, though, these two phenomena differ in that niche construction involves changes to the world (where the standard cases involve changes to the organism), whereas adaptive preferences involve changes to the agent itself (where the standard cases involve changes to the world). This, though, is not so relevant here.
Note that Odling-Smee et al. (2003) are using the term ‘niche construction’ widely to include all kinds of alterations of the environment—including migration into a new environment, metabolizing food, and photosynthesis. As will become clearer below, though, in this context, I will be using the notion in the narrower sense of changes to the environment that are adaptive. See also Okasha (2005), Sterelny (2005), Griffiths (2005), and Laland et al. (2005).
What follows is an extremely simplified and abstract reconstruction of these dynamics. For more detailed mathematical models of these sorts of cases, see Odling-Smee et al. (2003, chap. 3 and the relevant appendices).
Note that, technically, (1) and (2) would need to quantify over all the available ways of changing the environment [i.e. over all the different available ways of changing w (x) into some different w′(x)]. For simplicity, I have left this out here. Note also that the situation here could also be captured by thinking of a matrix where the columns list all of the relevant traits, and the rows the different available fitness assignments to these traits, with the first row containing the current, unchanged fitness values. Then a conservative solution would consist of cases where the maximal value in this matrix is in the first row, and a radical solution in cases where the maximal value is in a row other than the first one. Finally, defining the fitnesses of MR and MC themselves is a little tricky, but a natural way of doing so would be by setting w(MC) = max {w(Fi)} and w(MR) = max {w′(Fi)}.
There is an alternative way of conceptualizing niche construction (Dawkins 1982, chaps. 11–13; Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 30, 131–132, 191–192). On this alternative interpretation, one would make a distinction among the elements of F, with some being organism-focused (the F Ok ), and some environment-focused (the F Ek ). Given this, one should expect an organism-focused solution to an adaptive problem to evolve if and only if w(F Oi ) > w(F Ej ), for some i and all j, and an environment-focused solution to evolve if and only if w(F Ei ) > w(F Oj ), for some i and all j [where w(x) is again the fitness of trait x]. However, for present purposes, this reading of niche construction is less useful than the one in the text; this is so for two reasons. Firstly, the interpretation in the text seems to be more in line with the main idea behind niche constructionism—namely, that the activities of organisms are both effects and causes of evolutionary processes (Lewontin 1982; Odling-Smee et al. 2003, 48, 112–113, 240; Sterelny 2005; Laland et al. 2005; Sterelny 2003, 148–149). Secondly, it is especially the interpretation in the text that is useful for clarifying the contrast to the phenomenon of adaptive preferences.
Note that there are three main ways of understanding the major theories of choice in economics (Hausman 2012; Schulz 2011; Ross 2005): firstly, we could see the theories as providing a (possibly idealized) description of the agent’s actual decision making processes; secondly, we could see them as predictive tools for an agent’s choices without descriptive intent as far as her actual psychology is concerned; finally, we could see them as providing a standard of rationality that choices or decisions have to satisfy. For present purposes, though, it is not necessary to single out a particular interpretation of these theories, so I shall formulate the argument of the paper in a way that remains neutral on this issue.
This glosses over some contentious issues in economics—e.g. about the need for maximization (as opposed to merely satisficing); for more on this, see e.g. Gigerenzer and Selten (2001). For present purposes, though, I restrict myself to considering the standard framework. See also note 10 above.
More realistic instances of this sort of phenomenon include the fact that, in certain circumstances, oppressed people (e.g. women) seem to come to prefer a position of little political and social freedoms; equally, it appears that many consumers come to prefer whatever product they happen to own (Sen 1995; Nussbaum 2000; Kahneman et al. 1991). Apart from this, there is also much discussion in the medical literature about the fact that patients often seem to change the standards by which they assess their personal situation as that situation changes (a phenomenon known as ‘response shift’): see e.g. Sprangers and Schwartz (1999).
A related class of phenomena concerns cases of so-called ‘sour grapes’ (Elster 1983; Bovens 1992; Rickard 1995; Hill 2009): situations where agents change the way they think about the world to achieve a higher degree of desire satisfaction (the name refers to La Fontain’s fable, in which a fox learns that some grapes he thinks look tasty are hanging too high for him to reach; he then changes his mind and claims that the grapes are—or at least look—sour). This case is different from that of adaptive preferences, in that ‘sour grapes’ involve changes in an agent’s beliefs (or perceptions) rather than changes in her desires. In general, cases of ‘sour grapes’ raise different issues from the ones that are being discussed here (Zimmerman 2003; Bruckner 2009; Hill 2009).
The existence of adaptive preferences is sometimes also seen as a moral issue—in particular, it might be claimed that the existence of adaptive preferences is one of the prime reasons why social policy should not (just) take an individual’s preferences into account (Sen 1985, 1995; Nussbaum 2000, 2001; McKerlie 2007; Bykvist 2010; Hausman 2012). However, discussing this further is not necessary for present purposes.
Note that there is no clear analogue here to the organism-focused/environment-focused distinction mentioned in note 15: in economics, the actions an agent can do are not normally analyzed in a way that would make it possible to draw this distinction.
As before, Eqs. (3) and (4) should also quantify over the different feasible ways of changing an agent’s preference structure; also as before, I shall leave this aside for simplicity. Note also that it need not be the case that all ways of changing the utility function are equally feasible: changing one’s preferences may be difficult—e.g. in terms of time, concentration, and attention—so that only a few serious options actually exist at most times. Finally, as before, there is a matrix-based alternative way of conceiving this situation. See also note 14.
See Welsch (2005) and Hill (2009) for related accounts. Note, though, that Welsch’s (2005) model concerns a case in which an agent changes the weights attached to various goals she pursues while keeping fixed the utility she achieves from these weight/goal combinations—which is slightly different from how the issues are set out here. Hill (2009) pursues a line more similar to the one suggested here, though he also does not draw out quite the same implications as is done here.
Note also that, since circumstances of risk are ubiquitous, using a weaker theory than von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory will not generally be possible either (and, at any rate, utility would then be even less narrowly circumscribed). I thank Don Ross for useful discussion of this point.
So, for example, assuming that B is the gamble of getting A with probability 0.75 and D with probability 0.25, and C is the gamble of getting A with probability 0.25 and D with probability 0.75, then, according to von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory, it must be that, for a utility function u(x), u(B) = 0.75u(A) + 0.25u(D) and u(C) = 0.25u(A) + 0.75u(D) (this is due to the fact that, in von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory, the utility of a gamble is assumed to be identical to the expectation of the utilities of the gamble’s components). In turn, this implies that u(B) − u(C) = 0.5[u(A) − u(D)]; importantly, this will be so for all allowed rescalings of u(x). However, we then still cannot say anything about the absolute values of A through D across the scalings—and hence, across preference structures. So, if an agent starts by preferring A to D [so has u(A) > u(D) for some utility function u(x)], and then changes her mind and starts preferring D over A [so has u′(D) > u′(A), for some utility function u′(x)], we know that her ranking of B and C must also flip [i.e. we know that u(B) − u(C) > 0>u′(B) − u′(C)]. However, importantly, we cannot say that the utility she assigns to B before the change must be higher than the utility she assigns to C afterwards—after all, we could set u(A) = 100, u(D) = 1, giving u(B) = 75.25 and u(C) = 25.75, and u′(D) = 1, u′(A) = 0, giving u′(B) = 0.25 and u′(C) = 0.75. The only statements we can make here concern ratios of utility differences like this one: [u(B) − u(C)]/[u(A) − u(D)] = [u′(B) − u′(C)]/[u′(A) − u′(D)]. The latter, though, are too weak to capture cases of adaptive preferences, as they do not compare the utility values of the options themselves.
In principle, differences in preference profiles could also stem from differences in beliefs; however, as made clear in note 19 above, this case raises different issues from the ones at stake here, and thus will not be further considered.
The extent to which interpersonal comparisons of utility are similar to intrapersonal comparisons of utility is somewhat controversial; for discussion, see e.g. Hammond (1991), Broome (1991), Gibbard (1987), Griffin (1986, chap. 6); see also Binmore (2009). For present purposes, though, settling these issues is not necessary: no one in this literature thinks that utilities are always comparable in the intrapersonal case. This is all that matters here. For some useful recent discussions of the interpersonal comparability of utilities, see e.g. Sen (1979), Hausman (1995), Goldman (1995), Bradley (2008), and Binmore (2009).
Note, though, that the common extensions of von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory employed in practice—such as rank-dependent utility or the toleration of an agent choosing strictly dominated options—are not sufficient to achieve the needed kind of comparability (Diecidue and Wakker 2001). This is because these extensions only affect which kinds of transformations of a given utility function are equally acceptable as representations of a given preference ranking; however, they do not lead to the utility values themselves becoming comparable across preference structures. I thank Don Ross for useful discussion of this point.
Note the comparability of the relevant preferences does not mean that adaptive preferences must be in line with (EA): they would only be so if they did indeed maximize utilities in the case at hand.
Note that I am here not trying to uncover the historical reasons for why a relatively ‘unstructured’ account of utility was adopted. I am merely trying to argue that there is something to be said in favor of this account (whatever historically led to its adoption).
Though not always: see e.g. Busemeyer and Townsend (1993).
The nature of fitness is controversial, with some defending a subjectivist, reductive reading of this nature (Rosenberg 1994, 590–61). However, even these subjectivists about fitness would agree with what follows, but would merely add that these reproductive dispositions will, eventually, be replaced with precise statements of how many offspring each organism has. For more on fitness, see also Sober (2000, chap. 3, 2001).
Note, though, that not all fitness comparisons need to be meaningful in biology either: in particular, those across species or taxa might not be. However, the latter failure of comparability would then not be due to the fact that there is no reason to see fitness as having the necessary probabilistic structure, but rather due to the fact that the relevant traits are typically not part of the same evolutionary population (Godfrey-Smith 2009; Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, chap. 12). I thank Samir Okasha and Elliott Sober for useful discussion of this issue.
Another way of putting this point is that any ordinal equivalence between fitness and utility needs to hold not just synchronically and for the same agent, but also diachronically and across agents.
The reason for the second disjunct in (b) is that some cases require merely ordinal comparisons across unchanged fitness or utility values. As noted earlier, these cases do not pose inherent difficulties for connecting fitnesses and utilities.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Samir Okasha, Luc Bovens, Elliott Sober, Don Ross, Mauro Rossi, an anonymous referee for this journal, and audiences at the universities of Edinburgh, Bern, and Bristol for useful comments on previous versions of this paper.
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W. Schulz, A. Niche construction, adaptive preferences, and the differences between fitness and utility. Biol Philos 29, 315–335 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9439-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9439-x