Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 137–144 | Cite as

A critique of Stephane Savanah’s “mirror self-recognition and symbol-mindedness”

  • Robert W. Mitchell


Stephane Savanah (Savanah Biol Philos 28:657–673, 2013) provides a critique of theories of self-recognition that largely mirrors my own critique (though without recognizing it) that I began publishing two decades ago. In addition, he both misconstrues my kinesthetic-visual matching model of mirror self-recognition (MSR) in multiple ways (though he appears to agree with the actual model), and misconstrues the evidence in the scientific literature on MSR. I describe points of agreement in our thinking about self-recognition, and criticize and rectify inaccuracies.


Mirror self-recognition Kinesthetic-visual matching Association Children Apes 



I appreciate the good humor with which Stef Savanah read my critique and responded to emails.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyEastern Kentucky UniversityRichmondUSA

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