Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 49–71 | Cite as

A teleosemantic approach to information in the brain



The brain is often taken to be a paradigmatic example of a signaling system with semantic and representational properties, in which neurons are senders and receivers of information carried in action potentials. A closer look at this picture shows that it is not as appealing as it might initially seem in explaining the function of the brain. Working from several sender-receiver models within the teleosemantic framework, I will first argue that two requirements must be met for a system to support genuine semantic information: 1. The receiver must be competent—that is, it must be able to extract rewards from its environment on the basis of the signals that it receives. 2. The receiver must have some flexibility of response relative to the signal received. In the second part of the paper, this initial framework will be applied to neural processes, pointing to the surprising conclusion that signaling at the single-neuron level is only weakly semantic at best. Contrary to received views, neurons will have little or no access to semantic information (though their patterns of activity may carry plenty of quantitative, correlational information) about the world outside the organism. Genuine representation of the world requires an organism-level receiver of semantic information, to which any particular set of neurons makes only a small contribution.


Neurons Sender-receiver Signaling Semantic information Flexibility 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tufts UniversityMedfordUSA

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