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Selected effects and causal role functions in the brain: the case for an etiological approach to neuroscience

Biology & Philosophy volume 26, pages 547–565 (2011)Cite this article

Abstract

Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience. The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority of the causal role theory, the selected effects theory (when properly developed) can handle many cases from neuroscience with equal facility. It argues this by presenting a new theory of function that generalizes the notion of a ‘selection process’ to include processes such as neural selection, antibody selection, and some forms of learning—that is, to include structures that have been differentially retained as well as those that have been differentially reproduced. This view, called the generalized selected effects theory of function, will be defended from criticism and distinguished from similar views in the literature.

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Fig. 1

Notes

  1. The difference between selectionist and non-selectionist accounts of synaptic structure formation will be described in the following section.

  2. Not all biologists, nor philosophers of biology, would accept neural selection as a type of ‘natural selection.’ This is because, in their view, reproduction is a sine qua non of natural selection (e.g., Okasha 2003; see Bouchard 2008 for an opposing view and Godfrey-Smith 2007 for an overview of definitions of ‘natural selection’ and a description of the role of ‘reproduction’).

  3. Mace 1949 (1935) was one of the first to point out a conceptual link between operant conditioning and teleology, followed by Scheffler 1958.

  4. This is not the primary route through which Millikan attributes functions to novel traits. Rather, she relies on a distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘derived’ proper functions to make sense of the functions of novel traits (e.g., Millikan 1984, 41–42; 1989, 288). Although this is a reasonable distinction in some contexts, it has the unattractive conclusion that one must seek out a ‘direct function’ for many of the novel traits that one would like to ascribe functions to, even if it is not obvious what that direct function is. For example, brain changes underlying reading ability or the ability to play Tetris may have derived proper functions, but it is not clear from which direct proper functions those functions are derived.

  5. This ambiguity is reflected in the disparate ways he formulates the definition of ‘function.’ In his earlier presentation, the function of an entity is explicitly defined in terms of a ‘selection process’ (1987, 65). In his later presentation, the function of an entity is explicitly defined in terms of any self-perpetuating process: “X has the function of doing Y if and only if item X is now present as a result of causing Y” (1993, 45). In this latter view, being selected for is merely a ‘paradigm’ for the theory and not part of the definition.

  6. Godfrey-Smith (1992), like Papineau, explicitly includes both the products of natural selection as well as learning in an early account of biological function: “a selective basis for functional characterization is available whenever learned characters are maintained within the cognitive system because of their consequences” (ibid., 292). However, the problem with this view is that it does not specify that these learned characters must be the result of selection and not merely a generic, self-perpetuating process. Godfrey-Smith (1993, 199) rejects his earlier account of function and insists, along with Millikan, that in order for something to possess a function it must undergo reproduction, thus severing the link between evolution and learning. However, he may have avoided this admittedly unattractive conclusion (ibid.) if he had restricted functions to the parts of biological systems that undergo selection but which do not necessarily reproduce.

  7. Brandon (forthcoming) draws a similar conclusion by pointing to the valuable co-existence of historical and ahistorical concepts in many scientific disciplines.

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Acknowledgments

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Carl Craver, Gualtiero Piccinini, Anya Plutynski, and the University of Utah philosophy of biology lab group for comments and criticism on an earlier draft.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Hunter College of the City University of New York, 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY, 10065, USA

    Justin Garson

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Garson, J. Selected effects and causal role functions in the brain: the case for an etiological approach to neuroscience. Biol Philos 26, 547–565 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9262-6

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Keywords

  • Teleology
  • Function
  • Neuroscience
  • Mechanism
  • Selection
  • Neural Darwinism