Biology & Philosophy

, Volume 25, Issue 3, pp 361–378 | Cite as

Methods of ethics and the descent of man: Darwin and Sidgwick on ethics and evolution

Article

Abstract

Darwin’s treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin’s contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick’s response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin’s work in Sidgwick’s main ethical treatise, The Methods of Ethics. This assessment of Sidgwick’s response to Darwin’s work is shown to have significance for a number of ongoing controversies in contemporary metaethics.

Keywords

Charles Darwin Henry Sidgwick Ethics Evolution Moral skepticism Moral realism Reflective equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cambridge UniversityCambridgeUK

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