Abstract
Among scientific realists and anti-realists, there is a well-known, perennial dispute about the reality and knowability of unobservable objects. This dispute is also present among structural realists, who all agree that science gives us genuine knowledge of structure at the unobservable level (however that structure may be understood). Ontic structural realists reduce or eliminate the ontological role of objects, while epistemic structural realists argue that objects do or might exist but are unknowable. In part because ontic structural realism has some evidence from quantum mechanics and the consequent underdetermination of the metaphysics of objects in its favor, the majority of contemporary structural realists adopt that view. In contrast, I argue that epistemic structural realism is a highly compelling view, particularly in the form that remains agnostic about unobservable objects. This view can remain consistent with the empirical data from quantum mechanics, can give a satisfactory account of the metaphysics of structure, and can distinguish itself from other extant versions of realism. I provide two arguments in favor of agnosticism about objects, the first of which argues that suspending belief is consistent with the impetus of naturalized metaphysics, and the second of which argues that agnosticism about objects is a rational response to reflection on the limits and aims of science. Thus, I show that agnostic epistemic structural realism is a defensible and compelling view in the philosophy of science that demands more attention in the literature.
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Notes
It is worth noting that the No-Objects Thesis under this construction allows the existence of objects that do not have intrinsic properties, so such a view would still qualify as OSR.
For the sake of simplicity, I will use the term “extrinsic property” to refer to both extrinsic properties proper and relations. Nothing substantive about my argument is affected by this.
As French notes (2014: 39–40), the elimination of objects as fundamental that he prefers is quite similar to a ‘thin’ notion of objecthood that individuates objects in structural terms, such as is defended by Saunders (2006). This debate between elimination and ‘thin’ objecthood among defenders of OSR does not have any substantive effects on my argument, however, since both versions deny the existence of objects with intrinsic properties (i.e., affirm the No-Objects Thesis), whereas I argue that these versions of OSR deny objects too hastily given that remaining agnostic remains an option.
These various approaches to the metaphysics of science are critiqued and taxonomized by Guay and Pradeu (2020) in a very helpful way, but this aspect of the discussion is not relevant to my purpose here.
I have not used these terms to describe the two major versions of OSR, in part because I think the talk of “elimination” is misleading without some substantial caveats, but arguing for that thesis here would distract from my primary focus on arguing for agnostic ESR.
Chakravartty says that the minimal interpretation of equations will be preserved across theory change (Chakravartty 2007: 52–57). This approach can also be adopted and adapted to serve the structural realist, but addressing that here would draw attention away from the central point of defending agnostic ESR.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Berit Brogaard, Otávio Bueno, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Kari Hanson-Park, and the anonymous reviewers for comments and discussion that have greatly improved this paper.
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Hanson-Park, J. Structural Realism and Agnosticism about Objects. glob. Philosophy 33, 29 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09682-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-023-09682-2