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Extensions, Numbers and Frege’s Project of Logic as Universal Language

  • Nora GrigoreEmail author
Original Paper


Frege’s famous definition of number (in)famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle (where Frege does not use extensions). I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of his philosophical program of logic-as-an-universal-language. This is why Frege places his project in line with Leibniz’ philosophical project of finding a lingua characterica universalis.


Extensions Frege Language Logic Numbers 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BucharestRomania

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