I argue that modal realism is unable to account for fictional discourse. My starting point is an overview of modal realism. I then present a dilemma for modal realism regarding fictional characters. Finally, I provide responses to both horns of the dilemma, one motivating modal dimensionalism, the other motivating a disjunctive analysis of modality.
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Thanks to members of the Department of Analytic Philosophy of Slovak Academy of Sciences, and audiences at the University of Olomouc and the Hokkaido University for helpful feedback. This paper was written as a part of VEGA No. 2/0049/16 project: Fictionalism in Philosophy and Science.