, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp 409–432 | Cite as

Science Generates Limit Paradoxes

  • Eric Dietrich
  • Chris Fields
Original Paper


The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is the connection between our results and the realism-antirealism debate. We conclude by suggesting a position of epistemic modesty.


Apophenia Dialetheism Psychology Quantum measurement Realism Scientific knowledge 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBinghamton UniversityBinghamtonUSA
  2. 2.SonomaUSA

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