Axiomathes

, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 93–106 | Cite as

Free Will and Rationality

Original Paper
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Abstract

In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.

Keywords

Free will Libertarianism Intuition Argument from moral responsibility Rationality 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculdade de LetrasUniversidade de LisboaLisbonPortugal

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