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Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically

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Abstract

In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.

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Notes

  1. This ontic aim corresponds with one of the two ontic readings of mechanistic explanation advanced by Craver (2007, 2012). Craver’s second ontic reading equates explanations with ontic structures in the world, i.e., in the context of mechanistic explanations, with mechanisms in the world (see Sect. 2).

  2. Illari (2013) describes what sets of ontic and epistemic constraints do and states that epistemic considerations drive the choice of ontic aspects targeted for explanation and communication. I take this analysis (much) further: epistemic considerations are key in discovering the workings of those chosen ontic aspects/mechanisms. Causal role discovery is a vital epistemic constraint for achieving ontic and epistemic aims and thus a key notion relating the two (cf. Sects. 3 and 4).

  3. The notion that role function ascription is important for mechanistic explanation has been argued for at length by, notably, Craver (2001) and Illari and Williamson (2010). I here invoke role function discovery and ascription to engage the ontic-epistemic debate on mechanistic explanation.

  4. Decomposition-localization strategies are iterative of course; as experimental findings progress, so do the decompositions and localizations, sometimes resulting in re-describing/re-constituting the phenomena to be explained (cf. Bechtel and Richardson 1993).

  5. This is not to say that Bechtel and Craver agree on what (amount of) mechanistic information should be described in mechanistic models. Whereas Craver (2007) makes much of the notion that models should be complete descriptions of mechanisms, Bechtel, in joint work with Levy (Levy and Bechtel 2013), argues that it is often wise to abstract from the details of mechanisms.

  6. Although not phrased in causal role parlance, Craver’s (2007) analysis of mutual manipulability is intended to individuate those activities of entities that are constitutively relevant to the mechanisms of which they are a part, i.e., activities of entities that play a causal role in the operation of mechanisms. Craver (2001) and Illari and Williamson (2010) argue at length for the relevance of causal role functions in the individuation of mechanisms. I take Bechtel and Richardson’s (1993, 2010) work on decomposition and localization as also stressing this importance. To be sure, causal role parlance refers to intra-level causal relationships, constitutive relevance to inter-level constitutive relationships.

  7. Harbecke (2010) and Leuridan (2012) criticize the mutual manipulability account with respect to Craver’s definitions of constitutive relevance. Couch (2011) provides an extension, rather than a critique, of the account. I here address the evidential aspects of mutual manipulability and mechanism discovery.

  8. The contributions of entities’ activities to mechanisms of which they are a part are causal. The relationships between entities’ activities and the behaviors/activities of mechanisms as a whole are considered constitutive (Craver 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007). Causal relations are intra-level, constitutive ones are inter-level.

  9. They state these principles in terms of ‘cognitive phenomena’. This is to be understood broadly: the principles apply to “the discovery of cognitive and other biological mechanisms” (Silva 2007, p. 203). I take their phrasing of the principles in terms of ‘cognitive phenomena’ to derive from their goal to explicate reductive practices at work in the neurosciences, attempting to link cellular and molecular findings to cognitive phenomena.

  10. In Silva et al. (2013) these principles get book-length treatment and further elaboration. There, the first three principles make up the convergent three research principles, and the integration principle is now elaborated in terms of a variety of kinds of integration. Again, these authors speak about ‘cognitive’ phenomena, but this must be understood broadly to include phenomena the neurosciences deal with. For instance, memory formation, such as auditory fear conditioning, in rodents is labeled a cognitive phenomenon. Craver (2002, 2007) and Craver and Darden (2001) also discuss memory research at length yet speak about ‘phenomenon’ simpliciter. The research all these authors discuss is the same.

  11. The above examples are taken from Bickle (2008). References to the experiments mentioned can be found there.

  12. Deuterostomes and Protostomes are the two major clades of Bilaterians, classified on the basis of embryological and molecular criteria. Deuterostomes comprise a group of animals, ranging from sea urchins to vertebrates, in which the blastofore develops into the anus and the mouth develops from another opening in the embryonic gut. Protostomes comprise a group of animals, including insects, crabs, and snails, in which the blastofore develops into the mouth. The blastofore is an opening in the primitive gut during embryonic development. The primitive gut develops into the digestive tract of an animal. Bilaterians are a clade of animals with bilateral symmetry and in possession of a complex nervous system, ranging from insects and roundworms to humans. Cnidarians, in contrast, are a more primitive species of animals living in aquatic environments, whose behavior is coordinated by decentralized nerve nets and muscle activity.

  13. Another intriguing recent line of research concerns the genetic (molecular) mechanisms underlying (post)synaptic functioning in now extinct species (cf. Ryan and Grant 2009).

  14. This argumentation is not to be confused with the position of Bokulich (2008, 2012). Bokulich claims, in the context of classical versus quantum physics, that conceptualizations which are known to be fictions can genuinely explain. The features incorporated in models of now extinct mechanisms are however justified by current mechanistic findings and, hence, not known to be fictions. Rather, reference to currently existing mechanisms safeguards against including fictional posits in such models. Schindler (2013) argues against Bokulich’ claim that fictional posits explain. My analysis is thus immune to that criticism.

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Acknowledgments

I thank Raoul Gervais and an anonymous referee for constructive feedback.

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  1. Ghent University, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent, Belgium

    Dingmar van Eck

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van Eck, D. Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically. Axiomathes 25, 5–22 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9243-x

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