Axiomathes

, Volume 24, Issue 4, pp 483–497 | Cite as

No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

Original Paper

Abstract

According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne in Australas J Philos 80(3):359–371 2002; A future for presentism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006; Braddon-Mitchell in Analysis 64(283):199–203 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 555–562, 1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?

Keywords

Metaphysics No-futurism Growing block Metaphysical contingentism Skepticism Time travel 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Jiri Benovsky, Fabrice Correia, Filipe Drapeau Contim, Pierre Joray and anonynous referees for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Rennes 1RennesFrance

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