, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 551–566 | Cite as

How to Individuate Universals—Or Not

  • Richard Brian DavisEmail author
Original Paper


In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland (2013) extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.


Universals Individuation Mereological wholes Bare particulars 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTyndale University CollegeTorontoCanada

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