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Axiomathes

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 401–417 | Cite as

Exemplification as Explanation

  • Anna-Sofia MaurinEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper I critically investigate an unorthodox attempt to metaphysically explain in virtue of what there are states of affairs. This is a suggestion according to which states of affairs exist thanks to, rather than, as is the common view, in spite of, the infinite regress their metaphysical explanation seems to engender. I argue that, no matter in which form it is defended, or in which theoretical framework it is set, this suggestion cannot provide us with the explanation we crave.

Keywords

Exemplification Explanation Regress Gaskin Ontology Metaphysics 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Ingar Brinck, Göran Hermerén, Johannes Persson, and Nils-Eric Sahlin for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I have also benefitted from the comments received from one of this journal’s anonymous referees. A special thanks to Johan Brännmark without whose helpful comments and insightful criticisms I would not have been able to finish this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lund UniversityLundSweden

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