Artificial Intelligence and Law

, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 367–407 | Cite as

Establishing norms with metanorms in distributed computational systems

  • Samhar Mahmoud
  • Nathan Griffiths
  • Jeroen Keppens
  • Adel Taweel
  • Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon
  • Michael Luck
Article

Abstract

Norms provide a valuable mechanism for establishing coherent cooperative behaviour in decentralised systems in which there is no central authority. One of the most influential formulations of norm emergence was proposed by Axelrod (Am Political Sci Rev 80(4):1095–1111, 1986). This paper provides an empirical analysis of aspects of Axelrod’s approach, by exploring some of the key assumptions made in previous evaluations of the model. We explore the dynamics of norm emergence and the occurrence of norm collapse when applying the model over extended durations . It is this phenomenon of norm collapse that can motivate the emergence of a central authority to enforce laws and so preserve the norms, rather than relying on individuals to punish defection. Our findings identify characteristics that significantly influence norm establishment using Axelrod’s formulation, but are likely to be of importance for norm establishment more generally. Moreover, Axelrod’s model suffers from significant limitations in assuming that private strategies of individuals are available to others, and that agents are omniscient in being aware of all norm violations and punishments. Because this is an unreasonable expectation , the approach does not lend itself to modelling real-world systems such as online networks or electronic markets. In response, the paper proposes alternatives to Axelrod’s model, by replacing the evolutionary approach, enabling agents to learn, and by restricting the metapunishment of agents to cases where the original defection is observed, in order to be able to apply the model to real-world domains . This work can also help explain the formation of a “social contract” to legitimate enforcement by a central authority.

Keywords

Norms Metanorms Norm emergence 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We are immensely grateful to the anonymous reviewers, whose detailed and insightful comments have improved the content and presentation of this paper. Without their valuable work, this would be a much poorer paper, and its value much diminished.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samhar Mahmoud
    • 1
  • Nathan Griffiths
    • 2
  • Jeroen Keppens
    • 1
  • Adel Taweel
    • 1
  • Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon
    • 3
  • Michael Luck
    • 1
  1. 1.King’s College LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.University of WarwickCoventryUK
  3. 3.University of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK

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