, Volume 32, Issue 2, pp 155–173 | Cite as

Virtuous Arguers: Responsible and Reliable

  • José Ángel GascónEmail author


Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.


Character Education Reliabilism Responsibilism Skills Virtue argumentation Virtue epistemology 



This research was possible thanks to a pre-doctoral scholarship of the UNED and to the project FFI2014-53164-P of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation (ECA), in Fribourg, Switzerland. I thank Andrew Aberdein for his commentary and the audience for the fruitful discussion that followed.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)MadridSpain

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