, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 165–177 | Cite as

Must a Successful Argument Convert an Ideal Audience?

  • Xingming HuEmail author


Peter van Inwagen defines a successful argument in philosophy as one that can be used to convert an audience of ideal agnostics in an ideal debate. Sarah McGrath and Thomas Kelly recently argue that van Inwagen’s definition cannot be correct since the idea of ideal agnostics is incoherent with regard to an absolute paradigm of a successful philosophical argument. This paper defends van Inwagen’s definition against McGrath and Kelly’s objection.


Argument Philosophy Ideal agnostics The epistemological approach Peter van Inwagen 



I'd like to thank Nathan Ballantyne, Stephen Grimm, David Kovacs, Emily Sullivan, and two anonymous referees for their help comments on earlier versions of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nanjing UniversityNanjingChina

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