Argumentation

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 263–287 | Cite as

Logically Incorrect Arguments

Article

Abstract

What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong (and is such for purely logical reasons). In this paper, we show that pinpointing this stronger sense is much trickier than one would expect; but eventually we reach an explication of the notion of (strong) logical incorrectness which we find non-trivial and viable.

Keywords

Argumentation Logical form Incorrect argument Correct arguments 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Logic, Institute of PhilosophyAcademy of Sciences of the Czech RepublicPraha 1Czech Republic

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