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Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of subnational institutional contingencies on executive pay dispersion structure and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. Using executive compensation data on Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2011, we find that executive pay dispersion is significantly lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while is significantly higher in cross-listed firms and to a smaller degree in firms located in developed regions. There is also evidence that executive pay dispersion is smaller during the voluntary compensation disclosure period. After controlling for endogeneity of pay determination, we find that executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, the positive link between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, and stronger in firms located in more developed regions than those not. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.

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Fig. 1
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Notes

  1. Our paper focuses on vertical pay dispersion within a firm. Another level of pay dispersion, the horizontal pay dispersion, instead examines pay difference among employees holding the same job or at the same organizational level. Please refer to Gupta et al. (2012) and Trevor, Reilly, and Gerhart (2012) for a more comprehensive review of horizontal pay dispersion.

  2. Information obtained from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/

  3. Apart from the Hong Kong stock exchange, a limited number of Chinese firms have also chosen to cross-list on the New York Stock Exchange (issuing N share) or the London Stock Exchange (issuing L share). To our best knowledge, all firms cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange are also simultaneously cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. As a result, we use the HKS to represent a firm’s cross-listing status. Nevertheless, all these stock exchanges follow the Anglo-Saxon model and are under the influence of the Western culture different from the traditional Chinese norm.

  4. It should be noted that our sample is not equally distributed across years and is relatively small before 2005 because Chinese listed firms are not required to report individual executive compensation information until 2005 and only limited firms have chosen to do so. In addition, voluntary disclosure of compensation information is inconsistent across years. A firm may have chosen to report individual executive compensation information in a given year, but refrain from reporting it in another year. We conduct a sensitivity analysis later in the paper to mitigate potential problems caused by this unbalanced sample.

  5. Grants of equity incentives such as stock options and restricted stocks are not allowed in China before 2005. Even after 2005 these equity incentives are still rarely used. Conyon and He (2012) reported that only .15 % of listed firms grant equity incentives to their executives in 2005. The number is 2.23 % in 2006, .65 % in 2007, 1.81 % in 2008, 1.87 % in 2009, and 3.42 % in 2010. In addition, the disclosure of these incentives is rather vague. For example, most firms only disclose the number of granted stock options, but do not report exercise price or expiration time of stock options. As a result, excluding the fair-market value of equity incentive grants from our total compensation measures will not meaningfully affect our results.

  6. The CSRC classifies industries into 22 categories: 1: Agriculture and fishery; 2: Mining; 30: Manufacturing-food/beverage; 31: Manufacturing-Textiles; 32: Manufacturing-Furniture; 33:Manufacturing-Paper/Printing; 34: Manufacturing-Petroleum; 35: Manufacturing-Electronic; 36: Manufacturing-Metal/Non-metal; 37: Manufacturing-Machines; 38: Manufacturing-Pharmaceutical; 39: Manufacturing: others; 4: Electricity, water and other energy manufacturing and supply; 5: Construction; 6: Transportation and logistics; 7: Information technology; 8: Wholesales and retails; 9: Finance and insurance; 10: Real estate; 11: Service; 12: Communication; 13: Others.

  7. These graphs are generated using STATA 12 commands: margins and marginsplot.

  8. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing it out this alternative prediction.

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to conference participants at 9th Asia Academy of Management Conference 2015 and Decision Science Institute Annual Meeting 2013. This project is supported by two grants from National Natural Science Foundation of China: “Government Control, Marketization and the Efficiency of Top Management Compensation Contract in China” (71072003), and “Institutional Environment, Corporate Governance and CEO Governance” (71372119). We would also like to acknowledge Fujian 100 Innovation & Entrepreneurship Grant “Corporate Governance Environment, Innovation Infrastructure, and Entrepreneurship” and SUNY-Brockport Provost’s Post-tenure Fellowship award.

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  1. School of Economics & Management, Fuzhou University, Fujian, China

    Lerong He

  2. School of Business Administration & Economics, State University of New York at Brockport, Brockport, NY, USA

    Lerong He

  3. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

    Junxiong Fang

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He, L., Fang, J. Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion. Asia Pac J Manag 33, 371–410 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-015-9429-9

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