# The reverse TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems

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## Abstract

This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the so-called reverse Talmud rule and encompasses both the constrained equal-awards rule and the constrained equal-losses rule. The family, introduced by van den Brink et al. (Eur J Oper Res 228:413–417, 2013), is a counterpart to the so-called TAL-family of rules, introduced and studied by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (Soc Choice Welf 27:231–249, 2006a), and it is included within the so-called CIC-family of rules introduced by Thomson (Soc Choice Welf 31:667–692, 2008). We provide a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the family, as well as its connections with the existing related literature.

## Keywords

Bankruptcy problems Reverse TAL-family Reverse Talmud rule Equal awards Equal losses## JEL Classification

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