In this paper we address two-person bargaining problems under uncertainty where several states of nature or future scenarios are considered. We propose a solution concept based on the distance to a utopia minimum outcome vector, which guarantees conservative levels of achievement for the agents. We also provide an axiomatic characterization for a significant class of these bargaining problems. An extension of the classic model of firm-union negotiation, which includes situations where uncertainty about the consequences of the agreements have to be taken into account, is analyzed in this framework.
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This work was partially supported by the Andalusian Ministry of Economics, Innovation and Science project [P09-SEJ-4903]; and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation project [ECO2011-29801-C02-01].
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