We analyze the case of protecting an airport, in which there is concern with terrorist threats against the Air Traffic Control Tower. To deter terrorist actions, airport authorities rely on various protective measures, which entail multiple consequences. By deploying them, airport authorities expect to reduce the probabilities and potential impacts of terrorist actions. We aim at giving advice to the airport authorities by devising a security resource allocation plan. We use the framework of adversarial risk analysis to deal with the problem.
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration under grant agreement no 285223. Work has been also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation program MTM2011-28983-C03-01, the Government of Madrid RIESGOS-CM program S2009/ESP-1685 and the AXA-ICMAT Chair on Adversarial Risk Analysis. We are grateful to airport experts and stakeholders for fruitful discussions about modeling issues. This work was completed while the first author was visiting Uppsala University, supported by a grant from URJC’s postdoctoral program.
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Cano, J., Ríos Insua, D., Tedeschi, A. et al. Security economics: an adversarial risk analysis approach to airport protection. Ann Oper Res 245, 359–378 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1690-7
- Adversarial risk analysis
- Intelligent attacker
- Multiattribute expected utility
- Airport security