Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 245, Issue 1–2, pp 359–378 | Cite as

Security economics: an adversarial risk analysis approach to airport protection

  • Javier CanoEmail author
  • David Ríos Insua
  • Alessandra Tedeschi
  • Ug̃ur Turhan


We analyze the case of protecting an airport, in which there is concern with terrorist threats against the Air Traffic Control Tower. To deter terrorist actions, airport authorities rely on various protective measures, which entail multiple consequences. By deploying them, airport authorities expect to reduce the probabilities and potential impacts of terrorist actions. We aim at giving advice to the airport authorities by devising a security resource allocation plan. We use the framework of adversarial risk analysis to deal with the problem.


Adversarial risk analysis Intelligent attacker Multiattribute expected utility Airport security 



This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration under grant agreement no 285223. Work has been also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation program MTM2011-28983-C03-01, the Government of Madrid RIESGOS-CM program S2009/ESP-1685 and the AXA-ICMAT Chair on Adversarial Risk Analysis. We are grateful to airport experts and stakeholders for fruitful discussions about modeling issues. This work was completed while the first author was visiting Uppsala University, supported by a grant from URJC’s postdoctoral program.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Javier Cano
    • 1
    Email author
  • David Ríos Insua
    • 2
  • Alessandra Tedeschi
    • 3
  • Ug̃ur Turhan
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Computer Sciences and StatisticsRey Juan Carlos UniversityMadridSpain
  2. 2.Instituto de Ciencias MatemáticasICMAT-CSICMadridSpain
  3. 3.Deep BlueRomeItaly
  4. 4.Anadolu UniversityEskisehirTurkey

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