Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 221, Issue 1, pp 469–491 | Cite as

Publicity vs. impact in nonprofit disclosures and donor preferences: a sequential game with one nonprofit organization and N donors

  • Jun ZhuangEmail author
  • Gregory D. Saxton
  • Han Wu


Charitable giving is one of the essential tasks of a properly functioning civil society. This task is greatly complicated by the lack of organizational transparency and by the information asymmetries that often exist between organizations and donors in the market for charitable donations. The disclosure of financial, performance, donor-relations, and fundraising-related data is thus an important tool for nonprofit organizations attempting to attract greater donations while boosting accountability and public trust. There are, however, varying payoffs associated with such disclosure depending on the nature of donor preferences and the relative openness and effectiveness of competing organizations. To help understand the interplay between nonprofit organizational disclosures and individual donations, we present a novel game-theoretic model of disclosure–donation interactions that incorporates the predominant forms of both donor preferences and “value-relevant” information.


Voluntary disclosure Nonprofit organizations Donations Charitable giving Game theory Organizational communication Strategic communication 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Industrial and Systems EngineeringUniversity at Buffalo, SUNYBuffaloUSA
  2. 2.Department of CommunicationUniversity at Buffalo, SUNYBuffaloUSA

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