Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?

Abstract

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements, considering a sequential coalition formation process of heterogeneous and farsighted players. Players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by alternative proposals. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing and solving such a game and the strategic options arising in a sequential process. This is illustrated with simple examples and with numerical simulations using the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM).

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Correspondence to Johan Eyckmans.

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Finus, M., Rundshagen, B. & Eyckmans, J. Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?. Ann Oper Res 220, 5–23 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0815-x

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Keywords

  • International climate agreements
  • Sequential coalition formation
  • Integrated assessment model