Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 158, Issue 1, pp 205–218 | Cite as

Depreciation games



The main aim of this paper is to show how Game Theory can be used in the day-to-day running of a company. No precedent, as far as we know, in the literature of the application of Cooperative Game Theory in order to obtain new depreciation methods for a fixed asset which is owned by a company. To this end, we will first illustrate the usual depreciation methods employed in accountancy. Then, with the objective of finding new depreciation methods, we will establish the relationship between Game Theory and Accountancy. On the basis of this relationship we introduce some new depreciation methods. Finally, a family of solutions is defined which improves the properties of traditional and previously introduced methods.


Game theory Cost allocation Depreciation Accountancy 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Operations Research CenterUniversity Miguel Hernández of ElcheElche (Alicante)Spain

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