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On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

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Abstract

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed.

In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Mathematics II and Industrial Engineering School of Terrassa, Polytechnic University of Catalonia, Spain

    Francesc Carreras, M. Dolors Llongueras & Antonio Magaña

Authors
  1. Francesc Carreras
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  2. M. Dolors Llongueras
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  3. Antonio Magaña
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Additional information

Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.

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Carreras, F., Llongueras, M.D. & Magaña, A. On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games. Ann Oper Res 137, 67–89 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2245-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2245-8

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