Abstract
Nguyen et al. (2016) introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents’ utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation games in general, considering also the friends in other coalitions. Comparing our model to altruistic hedonic games, we argue that excluding some friends from the altruistic behavior of an agent is a major disadvantage that comes with the restriction to hedonic games. After introducing our model and showing some desirable properties, we additionally study some common stability notions and provide a computational analysis of the associated verification and existence problems.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous IJCAI’20 and AMAI reviewers for helpful comments. This work was supported in part by DFG grants RO 1202/14-2 and RO 1202/21-1. The first and third author have been supported in part by the research project “Online Participation” within the North Rhine-Westphalian funding scheme “Forschungskollegs.”
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Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. This work was supported in part by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under grants RO 1202/14-2 and RO 1202/21-1 and the NRW project “Online Participation.”
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Author Jörg Rothe currently is on the following editorial boards of scientific journals: \(\bullet \) Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (AMAI), Associate Editor, since 01/2020,\(\bullet \) Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), Associate Editor, since 09/2017, and \(\bullet \) Journal of Universal Computer Science (J.UCS), Editorial Board, since 01/2005.
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Kerkmann, A.M., Cramer, S. & Rothe, J. Altruism in coalition formation games. Ann Math Artif Intell 92, 601–629 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-023-09881-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-023-09881-y