Abstract
The aggregate empirical side of computational social choice has received relatively little attention. This paper provides a progress report on our on-going research project on statistical characterizations of the outcomes of vote-casting processes. We describe a statistical model that is capable of generating voting situations for three-candidate elections that have a distribution very similar to that of observed voting situations. We show that our simulated voting situations can provide interesting insights into the question of which voting rule is most likely to identify the best candidate.
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Tideman, T.N., Plassmann, F. Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice. Ann Math Artif Intell 68, 31–64 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9360-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9360-z