Abstract
Aim of this work is to provide a formal characterization of those emotions that deal with normative reasoning, such as shame and sense of guilt, to understand their relation with rational action and to ground their formalization on a cognitive science perspective. In order to do this we need to identify the factors that constitute the preconditions and trigger the reactions of shame and sense of guilt in cognitive agents, that is when agents feel ashamed or guilty and what agents do when they feel so. We will also investigate how agents can induce and silence these feelings in themselves, i.e. the analysis of defensive strategies they can employ. We will argue that agents do have control over their emotions and we will analyze some operations they can carry out on them.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Turrini, P., Meyer, JJ.C. & Castelfranchi, C. Coping with shame and sense of guilt: a Dynamic Logic Account. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 20, 401–420 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-009-9083-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-009-9083-z