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Applying game theory mechanisms in open agent systems with complete information

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Abstract

Game theory is a popular tool for designing interaction protocols for agent systems. It is currently not clear how to extend this to open agent systems. By “open” we mean that foreign agents will be free to enter and leave different systems at will. This means that agents will need to be able to work with previously unseen protocols. There does not yet exist any agreement on a standard way in which such protocols can be specified and published. Furthermore, it is not clear how an agent could be given the ability to use an arbitrary published protocol; the agent would need to be able to work out a strategy for participation. To address this we propose a machine readable language in which a game theory mechanism can be written in the form of an agent interaction protocol. This language allows the workings of the protocol to be made public so that agents can inspect it to determine its properties and hence their best strategy. Enabling agents to automatically determine the game theoretic properties of an arbitrary interaction protocol is difficult. Rather than requiring agents to find the equilibrium of a game, we propose that a recommended equilibrium will be published along with the protocol; agents can then check the recommendation to decide if it is indeed an equilibrium. We present an algorithm for this decision problem. We also develop an equilibrium which simplifies the complexity of the checking problem, while still being robust to unilateral deviations.

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  1. Department of Computing Science, King’s College, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, AB24 3UE, Scotland, UK

    Frank Guerin

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  1. Frank Guerin
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Correspondence to Frank Guerin.

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Guerin, F. Applying game theory mechanisms in open agent systems with complete information. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 15, 109–146 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-006-9005-2

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