Abstract
We reply to Artiga and Martinez’s claim according to which the organizational account of cross-generation functions implies a backward looking interpretation of etiology, just as standard etiological theories of function do. We argue that Artiga and Martinez’s claim stems from a fundamental misunderstanding about the notion of “closure”, on which the organizational account relies. In particular, they incorrectly assume that the system, which is relevant for ascribing cross-generation organizational function, is the lineage. In contrast, we recall that organizational closure refers to a relational description of a network of mutual dependencies, abstracted from time, in which production relations are irrelevant. From an organizational perspective, ascribing a function to an entity means locating it in the abstract system that realizes closure. In particular, the position of each entity within the relational system conveys an etiological explanation of its existence, because of its dependence on the effects exerted by other entities subject to closure. Because of the abstract relational nature of closure, we maintain that the organizational account of functions does not endorse a backward looking interpretation of etiology. As a consequence, it does not fall prey of epiphenomenalism.
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Notes
This is of course a simplification of the real situation. Among other things, there may be a partial overlap between the time scales t1 t2 and t3.
As a matter of fact, the organizational account could possibly be applied to describe other kinds of closed organizations that include individual organisms (such as social or ecological ones, see for instance Nunes Neto et al. 2014), and ascribe functions to their parts.
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Mossio, M., Saborido, C. Functions, Organization and Etiology: A Reply to Artiga and Martinez. Acta Biotheor 64, 263–275 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10441-016-9283-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10441-016-9283-2