Acta Biotheoretica

, Volume 62, Issue 3, pp 325–338 | Cite as

Fishermen’s Profits Maximization: Case of Generalized Nash Equilibrium of a Non-symmetrical Game

Regular Article


In the present paper, we consider a bio-economic equilibrium model which describes the dynamics of a fish population fished by several fishermen seeking to maximize their profits. Each fisherman tries to find the fishing effort which maximizes his profit at biological equilibrium without any consultation with others, but all of them have to respect two constraints: (1) the sustainable management of the resources ; and (2) the preservation of the biodiversity. With all these considerations, our problem leads to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The objective is to show that even when a fisherman \(i\) provides a fishing effort equal to twice the fishing effort of a fisherman \(j\), then the profit of fisherman \(i\) is not necessarily double that of fisherman \(j\).


Population dynamics Bio-economic equilibrium model Generalized nash equilibrium Sustainable management of the resources Preservation of the biodiversity Fisherman’s profit maximization 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Analysis, Modeling and Simulation Laboratory LAMSHassan II UniversityCasablancaMorocco
  2. 2.Mathematical Populations Dynamics Laboratory LMDPCadi Ayyad UniversityMarrakechMorocco
  3. 3.UMI UMMISCO, IRD - UPMCParisFrance

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