Annals of Finance

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 511–527 | Cite as

The interaction between corporate tax structure and disclosure policy

Symposium

Abstract

When socially desirable behaviors are deemed difficult to legislate, tax code is often called upon to indirectly achieve the desired ends. Adjustments to tax policy have been employed to spark investment, encourage charitable donations, and discourage tobacco consumption, to name a few examples. This paper demonstrates that tax policy may also be an effective means of encouraging welfare enhancing disclosures by firms. Further, by inducing disclosures of the right types of information while discouraging revelation of other types, tax policy proves to be a more versatile instrument than direct regulatory attempts which can mandate (but not prohibit) disclosures. The intuition behind our results is that when firms make decisions to disclose (or withhold) pieces of private information, such a decision is often made with an eye on the potential for a large payoff. In such cases, progressive taxes can dampen the appeal of big payoffs and better align the incentives of firms with those of consumers. In short, while progressive taxes may be criticized for curbing aggressiveness, it is precisely such a decrease in aggressiveness that can prompt efficient sharing of information.

Keywords

Competition Disclosure Progressive taxes 

JEL Classification

L5 M4 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fisher College of BusinessOhio State UniversityColumbusUSA
  2. 2.Yale School of ManagementYale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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