Abstract
We address the issue of modeling and quantifying the asset substitution problem in a setting where equityholders decisions alter both the volatility and the return of the firm cash flows. Our results contrast with those obtained in models where the agency problem is reduced to a pure risk-shifting problem. We find larger agency costs and lower optimal leverages. We identify the bankruptcy trigger written in debt indenture, which maximizes ex-ante firm value, given that equityholders will ex-post be able to risk-shift. Our model highlights the tradeoff between ex-post inefficient behavior of equityholders and inefficient covenant restrictions.
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Décamps, JP., Djembissi, B. Switching to a poor business activity: optimal capital structure, agency costs and covenant rules. Annals of Finance 3, 389–409 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-006-0049-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-006-0049-8