Abstract
The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)—under uncertainty—rather than perceptual effects.
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Notes
Although the implicit SoA is theoretically characterized to be implicit or pre-reflective, it is measured, in practice, as the explicit, conscious (temporal binding and sensory attenuation) reports. (However, in the visual perception domain, the term “implicit” implies an unconscious perception, which is indirectly deduced from the successful action in the absence of the conscious perception).
The Psychology literature makes a distinction between two usages of the term “judgment”: (1) any conscious and explicit verbal report (contra unconscious behavioral signature) that the participant makes in response to an experimental stimulus (e.g., Weber 1937), and (2) participants’ verbal report that is due to conceptual or inferential factors–as well as due to response biases or decisional factors–(contra verbal report that is based on genuine sensory perception) [e.g., Firestone and Scholl 2016]. In this paper, the term “judgment” refers to the second meaning i.e., a verbal report (particularly about perception) that is due to conceptual or cognitive factors rather than sensory (perceptual) factors.
The very fact that these inconsistent thoughts are judged to be contradictory implies that the person judging them is entertaining those thoughts; actually, it is due to entertaining those very contradictory thoughts that one can notice them to be contradictory in the first place. So, it is a different issue that these thoughts are contradictory and that these thoughts are not physically materializable, and it is a different issue that we can have contradictory thoughts and that these contradictory thoughts lead to epistemic discomfort and cognitive dissonance.
Benjamin Libet originally used this analog clock to study free will (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) while Haggard et al., (2002) used it to study the implicit SoA. [Benjamin Libet found that the moment of intention is temporally later to the moment of brain activation (or the readiness potential) and argued that we do not have free will as the intention might not be the cause if it is not temporally prior – as by definition, the cause is temporally prior to the effect].
Haggard et al., (2002)’s first-ever task used TMS induced finger twitch as the passive condition.
In the typical intentional binding task using the Libet clock (Haggard et al., 2002) it is found that during the voluntary condition, the subjective time of action (execution) is reported (by the participants) to be later than the objective time of action execution and the subjective time of seeing the action-effect is reported to be earlier than the objective occurrence-time of action-effect. Whereas in the involuntary or passive condition, these effects happen in reverse, i.e., the subjective time of action (execution) is reported (by the participants) to be earlier than the objective time of action (execution) and the subjective time of seeing the action-effect is reported to be later than the objective occurrence-time of action-effect.
In the verbal estimation tasks, the participants undergo exposure to the temporal interval, and they have to report the experienced interval or duration in chronometric units such as milliseconds, seconds or minutes (however, the verbal estimation method faces the problem that the participants tend to round off the time duration). In the time production task, the experimenter specifies the duration/interval in the chronometric units, and the participant produces the specified duration, e.g., by pressing a button for that specified amount of time. In the time reproduction task, the participant is presented with a sample or target duration (unlike the experimenter’s specification of time in chronometric units), e.g., as a continuous flash or sound and the participant has to reproduce the same duration, e.g., by pressing the button for the same amount of time equivalent to that of the previously presented sample duration. In the time comparison or the time discrimination task, the participant is being presented with two sequential intervals or durations, e.g., as continuous sounds or flashes, and the participant has to compare and differentiate between these two time intervals with regard to their relative time frame, i.e., whether the first one is shorter or longer than the second time interval—this is also referred to as the temporal bisection task.
Mathematically put, the interval of uncertainty’s range is 2 JNDs, or “the interval of uncertainty = upper limen – lower limen,” i.e., it ranges from the JND below the point of subjective equality to the JND above the point of subjective equality.
In the Libet clock based IB task, not only an extrapolation at the initial position of the clock’s dot/ hand occurs, but there also occurs a retropolation of the dot/hand at the final position of its motion.
But, Getzmann and Lewald (2007) found that motion extrapolation occurs at the initial and final positions of the moving object, and motion retropolation occurs in the middle phases. Hubbard and Motes (2002), Hubbard and Ruppel (2011) also found that motion extrapolation occurs at the final position, and retropolation at the initial position. So, the extrapolation or the retropolation, at either initial or final position, of the moving object are not consistent findings.
Some researchers attribute motion mislocalization effects to attentional factors (e.g., Hubbard, Kumar, & Carp, 2009; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2011). However, attentional explanation still discredits the perceptual explanation, as attention influences occur at the level of input rather than the level of (central) processing of the perceptual system (Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Raftopoulos, 2017).
Petzschner et al. (2015) put that the regression effect is the “tendency of subjective estimates to be biased towards the center of the distribution” (p. 286), range effect is “an increase of this bias for larger sample ranges” (p. 286), scalar variability is “a linear increase in standard deviation of estimates with mean magnitude” (p. 286), sequential or order effects are the “correlations between subsequent magnitude judgments” (p. 286).
The constant error is “a stimulus value equal to the value of the point of subjective equality minus the value of the standard stimulus” (Gescheider, 1997, p. 394).
It has to be noted that the magnitude estimation value is the mean (of all those wavering individual trials’ estimations) of an experimental block. These consistent but inaccurate magnitude estimation biases such as the constant error, regression effect, range effect, and sequential or order effects (that are ultimately calculated as the mean) can just be due to the skewing of those wavering estimations rather than due to a genuine sensory effect, as the participants can freely vary their estimations in the range/interval of uncertainty.
Dissociation between different cognitive processes is anticipated by the “modularity of mind” hypothesis.
Correlation does not imply causation, but non-correlation implies non-causation (assuming that the relationship in test is linear in nature).
But, see Piras and Coull (2011) for the claim of a common mechanism behind implicit action and explicit duration reports.
Motion extrapolation is reduced when the motion is towards left, compared to when it is to towards right (Halpern & Kelly, 1993) implying that extrapolation is based on the learning or prior knowledge or belief that the motion happens towards the right side.
But, the motion mislocalizations are also attributed to compensation for neural delays (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2007; Khoei et al. 2017; Nijhawan, 2008), perceptual latency (Krekelberg and Lappe 2001; Patel, Ogmen, Bedell, & Sampath, 2000), and crossmodal influences (Hubbard & Courtney, 2010) etc., (see, Hubbard, 2017; Maus, Khurana, & Nijhawan, 2010 for reviews).
Some researchers (e.g., Courtney & Hubbard, 2008) interpret these effects to be instances of cognitive penetration in motion perception, but I stress on the possibility of judgment effects under the inherent uncertainty in speedy motion perception.
Further, a general theory, "A theory of magnitude" (AToM) [Walsh, 2003] makes a link between magnitude estimation and attribute-substitution by proposing that humans have a tendency to substitute one magnitude with that of the other, across the domains of numbers, time, and space.
There is also evidence that the IB bias vanishes if motion localization in the Libet clock is performed by mouse click rather than as a verbal report (Joordens, Spalek, Razmy, & Van Duijn, 2004).
The intensity attenuation operationalization is incomplete as a test of perception, as we do not exclusively perceive intensities of the stimuli such as low or high auditory loudness or visual brightness etc., but we do also perceive categories such as (auditory categories like) bells and thunders or (visual categories like) faces and houses. Although there is a prevalence of metric/magnitudinal perceptual stimuli (in the implicit SoA operationalizations) the categorical percepts are equally relevant for SoA operationalization as we do “act” or “agentive upon” on categories such as bells, houses, faces also.
Is it spurious to distinguish between categories and magnitudes with respect to psychophysical judgments? No! For instance, stimuli of different categories, e.g., bell sound and laughter sound with the same intensity or magnitude will still be perceived differently; so the distinction between magnitudes and categories is not trivial.
But see, Cardoso-Leite et al., (2010) for the presence of sensory attenuation using stimuli of Gabor patches. However, this finding is due to the fact that the perception of Gabor patches can be converted into a magnitude estimation task if the experimental question used is “how much tilted is the orientation of Gabor patch?”.
However, this sort of categorical questioning is rarely operationalized in the implicit SoA experiments. If one uses the category kind of question, then there would not be any evidence of agency’s influence as the participants can always distinguish the big and small intensities (as long as they fall beyond the range of interval of uncertainty).
According to the power law “the relationship between sensation magnitude and stimulus intensity is a power function in which sensation magnitude is proportional to stimulus intensity raised to a power” (Gescheider, 1997, p. 402).
Similarly, concerning time perception, the question of “how long is it” (rather than “is it short or long” question) is typically asked in time perception tasks such as verbal estimation of duration, time interval production, time interval reproduction. However, the duration perception, which is measured as a metric/magnitudinal type (through the measures of duration estimation, temporal production, etc.), can also be made categorical by changing the question from "how long" to "is it short or long (among two different durations)" by employing the temporal bisection task (Penney and Cheng 2018) as the temporal bisection too obeys power-law or the power function proportionality (Kopec and Brody 2010) which I contend that nullifies the top-down influences (from agency states) in time perception.
Although real-life demonstrations have a bane of uncontrollability from extraneous variables, they have a boon of ecological validity.
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Reddy, N.N. The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect. Cogn Process 23, 1–13 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-021-01066-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-021-01066-x