Belief revision and way-finding

Abstract

Belief revision is required when veridical information surfaces that contradicts what was previously thought to be the case. In way-finding, belief revision frequently occurs, for example, when the travelled route has led one astray, instead of to one’s chosen destination. In past cognitive research, the topics of belief revision and way-finding have been treated in isolation. Here, we introduce an approach for linking the two fields and assess belief revision as it occurs in the process of way-finding. We report the results of two experiments that put participants in (virtual) situations where elements of a previously learned route description do not match the actual environment (thereby requiring the revision of a previously held belief). Experiment 1 puts participants in a highly artificial virtual environment where the landmarks to be used in navigation have a low degree of semantic salience (houses of various color). Experiment 2 puts subjects in a photorealistic environment where the objects to be used in navigation are well-known landmarks (such as the Eiffel Tower) and thus have a high degree of semantic salience. In both experiments, participants are confronted with T-junctions, where a landmark that was expected to indicate the correct route is discovered to be in an unexpected location. The results of the experiments show that a participant’s choice of route, in such cases, is affected by differences in the structure of the relevant initial instruction. More precisely, the route chosen by participants is affected by whether the relevant landmark was described as being on the same side of the path as they were instructed to turn (congruent case) or as located on the opposite side of the path as they were instructed to turn (incongruent case).