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A new asynchronous traction signal spoofing algorithm for PLL-assisted DLL receiver

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Abstract

The global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing technology is an important method to control the targets that pose threats and protect sensitive areas. Traction spoofing can gradually take over the tracking loop by spoofing signals. To achieve more covert spoofing of a receiver configured with phase lock loop (PLL) assisted delay lock loop (DLL) loop, the following research work has been carried out: First, the response of the combined loop to GNSS spoofing is analyzed; Second, a new asynchronous traction signal spoofing algorithm is proposed; in the design of the code rate and carrier frequency of spoofing signal, the dynamic performance of the loop is fully considered, while maintaining a good consistency with the carrier frequency. In the design of the power of the spoofing signal, the success rate of spoofing is improved as much as possible while avoiding absolute power monitoring. Finally, the calculation method of the parameters of the spoofing signal is given. Third, by building the GNSS signal generation software and software receiver platform to carry out experimental verification and through experimental comparison and analysis with many existing representative spoofing schemes, it is proved that the new algorithm can successfully achieve spoofing. The spoofing takes 107.8 s, which makes the local code rate increase 0.03 Hz, the carrier frequency increase 50 Hz, the average value of consistency spoofing detection is 9.40 × 10−3, and finally stabilized at the convergence value  − 2.95 × 10−8, that is, during the spoofing process, spoofing signal maintains the consistency of the authentic signal, which can well avoid the consistency spoofing detection of the receiver, the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed algorithm compared with other spoofing methods are fully verified.

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Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, Grant number 42071454 and was also funded by the State Key Laboratory of Geo-Information Engineering, Grant number SKLGIE2020-Z-2-1.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Geospatial Information, PLA Strategic Support Force Information Engineering University, Zheng Zhou, China

    Yangjun Gao & Guangyun Li

  2. Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications Technology, Beijing, China

    Yangjun Gao

  3. State Key Laboratory of Geo-Information Engineering, Xi’an, China

    Yangjun Gao

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  1. Yangjun Gao
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  2. Guangyun Li
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YG and GL wrote the main manuscript text. All authors reviewed the manuscript.

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Correspondence to Guangyun Li.

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Gao, Y., Li, G. A new asynchronous traction signal spoofing algorithm for PLL-assisted DLL receiver. GPS Solut 27, 141 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10291-023-01478-6

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