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Review of World Economics

, Volume 145, Issue 4, pp 597–613 | Cite as

Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis

  • Michael O. MooreEmail author
  • Alan K. Fox
Original Paper

Abstract

Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

Keywords

Antidumping Facts-available US trade policy 

JEL Classification

F10 F13 F14 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank an anonymous referee and seminar participants at Tilburg University, George Washington University, the Southern Economics Association meetings in Washington, DC and the Midwest International Economics Group meetings at Michigan State University. Maggie Chen deserves special thanks. Remaining errors are our own.

References

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Copyright information

© Kiel Institute 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and Institute for International Economic PolicyGeorge Washington UniversityWashingtonUSA
  2. 2.US International Trade CommissionWashingtonUSA

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