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Project Assistance versus Budget Support: An Incentive-Theoretic Analysis of Aid Conditionality

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Abstract

Foreign aid is conveyed predominantly in the form of project assistance, rather than general budgetary support for the recipient government. Most theoretical explanations of this phenomenon center on the possibility of a divergence of preferences, or opinions, between donor and recipient. Projects or conditional transfers, rather than “cash”, may then be ways by which donors align the recipients’ incentives more closely with their own preferences. This paper proposes an alternative, complementary, explanation, based on information asymmetries between voters in donor nations, and their aid agency administrators. If voters are uncertain about the “type” of their administrator agent, who is better informed about the efficacy of alternative policies, then project assistance may be chosen, even when budget support provides a more efficient alternative.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Virginia, 2015 Ivy Rd, #312, 22904, Charlottesville, VA, USA

    Sanjay Jain

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  1. Sanjay Jain
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Correspondence to Sanjay Jain.

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JEL no.

F35, O19, D82

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Jain, S. Project Assistance versus Budget Support: An Incentive-Theoretic Analysis of Aid Conditionality. Rev World Econ 143, 694–719 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-007-0128-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-007-0128-6

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