Abstract
Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today’s Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate.
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This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61632017, 61761146005, 71771161, 71471091). Dominik Scheder acknowledges support by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61502300.
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Cheng, Y., Deng, X. & Scheder, D. Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing. 4OR-Q J Oper Res 16, 231–260 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10288-018-0385-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10288-018-0385-3